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Abstract
Prior to the subprime crisis, mortgage brokers charged higher percentage fees for loans that
turned out to be riskier ex post, even when conditioning on other risk characteristics. High
conditional fees reveal borrower attributes that are associated with high borrower risk, such
as suboptimal shopping behavior, high valuation for the loan or high borrower-specic broker
costs. Borrowers who pay high conditional fees are inherently more risky, not just because
they pay high fees. We nd a stronger association between conditional fees and delinquency
risk when lenders have fewer incentives to screen borrowers, for purchase rather than renance
loans, and for loans originated by brokers who have less frequent interactions with the lender.
Our ndings shed light on the proposed QRM exemption criteria for risk retention requirements
for residential mortgage securitizations.
JEL Classications: G12, G18, G21, G32
Keywords: Mortgage brokers; Loan performance; Subprime crisis; Credit risk retention; Qualied residential
mortgages
We are grateful for nancial support from the Darden School Foundation and the McIntire Center for Financial
Innovation. We are grateful to Vijay Bhasin, Bo Becker, Sonny Bringol, Dwight Jaee, Gyongyi Loranth, Atif Mian,
Amit Seru, Amir Su, Alexei Tchistyi and Nancy Wallace for helpful discussions, and Michael Gage of IPRecovery
for technical support for the New Century database. We thank seminar participants at numerous universities and
conferences for useful comments.
yTepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213. Phone: 412-268-1871. Email:
aberndt@andrew.cmu.edu.
zTepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 15213. Phone: 412-268-6505. Email:
burtonh@andrew.cmu.edu.
xMcIntire School of Commerce, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, 22904. Phone: 434-243-2289. Email:
patriks@virginia.edu.Mortgage brokers act as nancial intermediaries matching borrowers with lenders. In this
paper, we explore the loan-level link between broker charges and mortgage credit risk.1 A credit
event occurs when the loan becomes delinquent for the rst time. We establish that high broker
revenues, measured as a percentage of loan amount, are associated with high delinquency risk. Our
data include all broker-originated loans funded by formerly one of the largest subprime lenders, New
Century Financial Corporation, between 1997 and 2006. The average 12-month delinquency rate
increases from 10% for loans with percentage revenues of 1-2% to 19% for loans with percentage
revenues of more than 5%.
The link between percentage broker revenues and mortgage credit risk may arise because rev-
enues proxy for other risk characteristics. For example, as long as there are xed broker costs
associated with originating a loan, percentage revenues are likely to be larger for smaller loans.
In our data, average percentage revenues decline steadily as the loan size increases. Small loans,
however, are often taken out by low-income, low-FICO-score borrowers and are generally riskier
than large loans. As a result, high percentage revenues serve as an unconditional indicator of high
delinquency risk.
Are broker revenues related to delinquency risk even when conditioning on other observable
characteristics? \Observable" refers to loan, property, borrower and broker characteristics ob-
served by the lender and the econometrician. Observable data include mortgage rates but exclude
information available only to the borrower and the broker. We provide comprehensive evidence
that high conditional broker revenues re
ect otherwise unobserved mortgage credit risk. Based
on a proportional odds duration model for the probability of rst-time delinquency, a marginal
increase in percentage revenues by 1% is associated with a 6.4% higher odds ratio.
The mortgage brokers in our sample are compensated by charging a direct fee to the borrower
and from a yield spread premium (YSP) paid by the lender. The marginal predictive power of broker
revenues for delinquency risk stems from the direct fees rather than the yield spread premia. Given
a set of observable characteristics and the YSP, an increase in percentage fees by 1% is associated
with a 7.6% higher odds ratio of rst-time delinquency. A one standard deviation increase in
conditional percentage fees is associated with a 8.0% higher odds ratio. Our nding that high
conditional fees predict high mortgage credit risk is supported by several robustness checks.
The association between high conditional fees and high delinquency risk that we document
1Most recent studies, such as Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) and Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2011), relate
delinquency risk to loan, property and borrower characteristics but, due to a lack of data, do not control for loan
originator compensation. An exception is Garmaise (2009) who takes an in-depth look at broker-lender relationships
for prime loans. The median borrower in his sample, however, does not pay any direct broker fees, thereby making
it dicult to establish a link between such charges and mortgage credit risk.
1suggests that there are unobserved borrower attributes that are associated with high mortgage
credit risk. To shed light on these attributes we use a simple model of bargaining between the
borrower and broker where the broker learns the borrower's reservation value for the fees and has
all the bargaining power. The broker can set the fees without a feedback eect on other terms of
the loan. Borrowers shop from one or more brokers according to a second-price auction process
(Woodward and Hall (2012)).
The model implies that brokers extract high conditional fees from borrowers with any of the
following attributes: (i) borrowers who shop from few brokers, including (ii) borrowers with a
high conditional value for the loan who shop from only one broker, or (iii) borrowers who shop
from multiple brokers but for whom brokers perceive conditional origination costs to be high. Our
ndings suggest that borrowers with these attributes tend to pay higher fees and tend to be more
risky than borrowers with the same observable characteristics but without these attributes.
We present evidence that refutes the hypothesis that borrowers are riskier because they pay
higher fees, in favor of the hypothesis that borrowers who pay high conditional fees are inherently
more risky. We conjecture that the more the lender knows about the borrower, the weaker the
association between conditional fees and delinquency risk, especially if the additional information
is incorporated into mortgage rates. We oer a number of results in support of the conjecture.
First, we nd a stronger association between conditional fees and delinquency risk when lenders
have fewer incentives to screen borrowers for \soft" information such as the borrower's exposure
to future income shocks. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2009) and Bubb and Kaufman (2009)
argue that during our sample period, lenders had less incentive to screen borrowers with high FICO
scores than borrowers with low FICO scores. We interact percentage fees with FICO scores and
nd that conditional fees reveal more unobserved borrower risk for high-FICO loans.
Second, conditional fees are less informative about delinquency risk for renance loans than for
purchase loans. Lenders are likely to have more housing-related information about borrowers who
renance an existing loan than borrowers who purchase a home for the rst time. In addition,
renance loans tend to have a lower combined loan-to-value ratio than purchase loans. Borrowers
with larger down payments may be more homogeneous in their attitude towards delinquency risk.
Third, we document a weaker association between conditional fees and delinquency risk for loans
originated by active brokers, that is by brokers who have frequent interactions with the lender.
Active brokers may value their relationship with the lender more than inactive brokers, and hence
may transmit more soft information regarding the borrower's ability to repay the loan to the lender.
Can the empirical link between broker charges and delinquency risk that we uncover be used
2by lenders or regulators? Given a set of observable characteristics, consider a broker-revenue-based
rate schedule where the mortgage rate increases if percentage revenues exceed the threshold  R.
If  R is a constant, the schedule re
ects the unconditional link between percentage revenues and
delinquency risk. If  R is some benchmark conditional revenue, the schedule re
ects the conditional
link between revenues and delinquency risk.
The Dodd-Frank Act subjects residential mortgage securitizations to credit risk retention re-
quirements. Rule 8 of the proposed Qualied Residential Mortgage (QRM) restrictions for loans to
be exempt from risk retention is likely to result in a revenue-based rate schedule with  R = 3%. We
do not speculate how the introduction of such a rate schedule may impact future borrower-broker
interactions. Instead, we observe that borrowers would have to pay a higher rate whenever the
broker's percentage costs exceed 3%. Broker costs are the costs that the broker expects to incur
between the time she strikes a deal with the borrower and the loan closing.
We consider a wide range of cost estimates spanned by two polar cases. In the rst case, that
of perfect rent extraction, the broker's cost is equal to the minimum conditional revenue. Provided
some loans are originated at cost, the perfect rent extraction case is consistent with a scenario
where borrowers shop from only one broker and there is no unobserved heterogeneity in costs. In
the second case, that of perfect competition, the cost is set equal to the revenue. The perfect
competition case is consistent with borrowers shopping from multiple brokers with the same cost.
We show that independent of the assumptions underlying the cost estimates, average percentage
costs are larger for smaller loans. Hence the proposed QRM Rule 8 is likely to result in higher rates
for smaller{and unconditionally riskier|loans. It is unlikely, however, to impose any constraints
on mortgage rates for larger loans.
1. The Mortgage Origination Process
We develop a model of the mortgage origination process to understand how broker origination
charges are determined and what they may reveal about mortgage credit risk. We focus on loans
originated in the wholesale market, where independent mortgage brokers act as nancial intermedi-
aries matching borrowers with lenders. Brokers assist borrowers in the selection of the loan and in
completing the loan application, and provide services to wholesale lenders by generating business
and helping them complete the paperwork.
Consider a borrower who arrives at a broker requesting a mortgage.2 The broker evaluates the
2The borrower is matched with the broker either by chance, following a recommendation of a real estate broker or
someone else, or as a result of marketing eorts by the broker. We do not model borrower-broker interactions prior
3borrower's and the property's characteristics, and based on that information provides the borrower
with one or more nancing options. A nancing option consists of a specication of the loan terms
such as the loan amount, type of loan and level of income documentation, and of the associated
mortgage rate. It also outlines the fees the broker will charge the borrower.
To compile the list of nancing options, the broker reviews wholesale rate sheets distributed by
potential lenders. These rate sheets state the minimum rate at which a given lender is willing to
nance a loan, as a function of loan, borrower and property characteristics. We refer to this rate as
the lender's base rate. Rate sheets also inform the broker about the yield spread premium, if any,
that the lender pays to the broker for originating the loan at a rate higher than the base rate. The
borrower and the broker bargain over the terms of the loan, the rate and the fees. Once they reach
an agreement, the broker submits a funding request to one or more lenders. The lender reviews the
application material and responds with a decision to fund the loan or not. If the loan is funded,
the broker receives the fees and YSP at the loan closing.
Suppose that a lender will fund the loan as long as the broker collects and transfers the requested
application materials and secures a rate at or above the lender's base rate. Since the broker is paid
only if the loan is made, she will only oer fundable proposals to the borrower and will ensure that
the application materials are presented to the lender in a timely fashion. Let L denote the vector
summarizing the terms of the loan including the loan type, the loan amount, the loan maturity,
the documentation level, and any prepayment penalties. The initial mortgage rate r has to be
at or above the base rate of the lender to whom the loan application is submitted. We use f to
denote the fee that the broker charges the borrower for originating the loan. Each vector (L;r;f)
represents a nancing option, and the borrower and broker have to agree on L, r and f.
The borrower's net benet from the loan is f   f, where f denotes the borrower's reservation
value for the fees and is given by
f =    o:
Here,  measures the dollar value of the benets the borrower expects to draw from owning the
home in excess of the expected present value of the mortgage payments for the loan (L;r). We
use o to denote the dollar value of the borrower's outside options as perceived by the borrower at
the time the deal is made. The entire benet that the borrower perceives to gain from purchasing
the house or renancing the loan is    o(no mortgage), where o(no mortgage) is the value of not
receiving the mortgage. We refer to    o(no mortgage) as the borrower's valuation for the loan.
to the time that a deal is made.
4Let y denote the YSP paid by the lender and c denote the broker's cost of originating the loan.
Broker costs are the costs the broker expects to incur between the time she strikes a deal with the
borrower and the time the loan closes. They include the broker's time costs of dealing with the
borrower as well as any administrative costs paid by the broker for intermediating the mortgage.
The broker's reservation value for the fees, f, is equal to
f = c   y; (1)
and the broker's net benet from originating the loan is f   f.
The borrower's and broker's joint surplus is the sum of their respective benets,
f   f =    o + y   c: (2)
We consider a simple model of bargaining between the borrower and broker where the broker learns
the borrower's reservation value f and has all the bargaining power. The broker maximizes her
net benet f + y   c by choosing the lender and (L;r;f), subject to the borrower's participation
constraint, f     o, and to the broker's participation constraint, f  c   y.
We assume that fees f can be set without a feedback eect on other terms of the loan. Our
inspection of several lender rate sheets revealed no connection between broker fees and the lender's
base rate. While the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA) imposed a
number of restrictions on loan features for certain mortgages, including those with very high fees,
the ceiling on fees was binding only for a small fraction of loans.3
1.1. Setting fees when there is no feedback to loan terms
As long as the fees f can be set without impacting other terms of the loan, the broker sets the
fee equal to the borrower's reservation value,
f =    o: (3)
From Equations (1) and (3) the broker's net benet is    o + y   c: the broker captures all the
joint gains from trade in Equation (2). The terms of the loan and the mortgage rate are set so as
3HOEPA high-fee loans are dened as loans for which total origination charges exceed the larger of $592 or 8% of
the loan amount. The $592 gure is for 2011. The amount is adjusted annually by the Federal Reserve Board, based
on changes in the Consumer Price Index. For details see www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/homes/rea19.shtm.
The rules for loans are listed in Section 32 of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Z. \Section 32 mortgages" are
banned from balloon payments, negative amortization, and most prepayment penalties, among other features.
5to maximize those gains from trade, provided that the broker's revenues cover the costs, f +y  c.
The broker's total revenues are f + y = c + (   o + y   c). The revenues are equal to the
cost of intermediating the loan plus the surplus that the broker is able to capture. We refer to the
surplus captured by the broker,   o+y c, as marginal broker prots. These marginal prots do
not immediately inform about potential prots a new entrant to the mortgage broker business may
obtain since they do not control for the costs of identifying and attracting prospective borrowers.
1.2. Borrower shopping behavior
The borrower's shopping behavior determines the value of his outside options, o, and therefore
the broker fees. Let K denote the number of brokers the borrower shops from. If K = 1, the
borrower shops from only one broker, the outside option is no mortgage. The broker can extract
the entire benet that the borrower perceives to gain from purchasing the house or renancing the
loan, and fees are equal to the borrower's valuation for the loan,    o(no mortgage).
If K  2, the borrower shops from multiple brokers.4 Similar to Woodward and Hall (2012),
we assume a second-price auction process where the borrower seeks initial quotes from K brokers
and uses these quotes to extract better proposals until the process ends with one quote that no
other broker is willing to beat. The observed revenue is the cost of the second-lowest-cost broker.
The originating broker extracts all of the surplus in the bargain with the borrower, whose outside
option is to accept the runner-up bid. In summary, the originating broker's revenue is equal to




   o(no mortgage) + y; when K = 1
cost of second-lowest-cost broker; when K  2:
(4)
2. Linking Broker Charges and Mortgage Credit Risk
We use our model framework to formulate a number of hypotheses about the link between per-
centage broker charges and mortgage credit risk. Percentage charges refer to charges measured as
a percentage of the loan amount. We refer to a loan with certain characteristics as risky if average
delinquency rates across all loans with those characteristics are high.
Hypothesis 1. Unconditionally, loans with high percentage revenues are riskier than loans with
low percentage revenues.
Assuming that broker revenues are set as in Equation (4), the following scenario is consistent with
Hypothesis 1:
4We only count those brokers whose reservation value for the fees does not exceed the borrower's benet from
purchasing the house or renancing the loan.
6Scenario 1. There are xed costs associated with originating loans so that broker costs, as a
percentage of loan amount, are decreasing in the size of the loan. Borrowers' valuations for loans,
as a percentage of loan amount, are larger for smaller loans. Percentage yield spread premia are

at or decreasing in the size of the loan. As a result, percentage revenues are larger for smaller
loans. Unconditionally, smaller loans are riskier.
Are broker revenues related to delinquency risk even when we condition on other observable
characteristics? To dene the term \observable characteristics," we take the view that the broker's
information set, as it pertains to a mortgage transaction, includes the borrower's information set.
The econometrician|meaning us, a regulator or another third party|observes the information
provided on the loan application, including the broker's identity and fees. The econometrician also
observes certain broker characteristics and any yield spread premia paid by the lender, which the
borrower may or may not observe. The lender's information set is the same as the econometrician's,
unless the lender exerts additional eorts to screen applicants for soft information. We refer to
\observable" data as the data observed by the econometrician at the time of origination, inclusive
of mortgage rates. Conditional revenues do not condition on fees nor on YSP. Conditional fees,
however, do condition on YSP in addition to the other controls.
If there is variation in conditional broker fees, it may be unrelated to mortgage credit risk. Al-
ternatively, high conditional fees may be associated with high delinquency risk, or high conditional
fees may be associated with low delinquency risk. We formally test the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Conditional on a set of observable characteristics, broker fees have no predictive
power for mortgage credit risk.
A scenario consistent with Hypothesis 2 is one where there is no unobserved heterogeneity in
broker fees. Suppose that Hypothesis 2 is rejected by the data and that we nd evidence that
high conditional fees predict high mortgage credit risk. According to Equation (4), brokers extract
high conditional fees from borrowers who shop from few brokers, including borrowers with a high
conditional valuation for the loan that shop from only one broker, and from borrowers who shop
from multiple brokers but for whom brokers perceive conditional costs to be high. If high conditional
fees are associated with high mortgage credit risk, the following holds:
Scenario 2. Conditional on a set of observable characteristics, borrowers who turn out to be
riskier ex post tend to shop from fewer brokers, have a higher valuation for the loan or have higher
borrower-specic broker costs.
7To describe Scenario 2 in more detail, we analyze the sources of unobserved heterogeneity in
the borrower's valuation for the loan,    o(no mortgage). We measure time in months and use T
to denote the maturity of the loan, TP the time at which the borrower prepays the loan in full, and
TD the time of mortgage default. Assuming that the borrower is risk-neutral,  is given as
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; (5)
where m is the borrower-specic discount factor for spending or receiving one dollar m months
from now and 1fg denotes the indicator function.
We use hm to denote the value the borrower receives from occupying in the house in month
m, and Hm to denote the time-m value that the borrower receives from the home from month m
on. The mortgage is terminated early if either prepayment or default occurs prior to the original
maturity date. The payments made in month m are denoted by pm. They include the principal
and interest payments due after m months, and may also include any additional down payments
on principal that the borrower plans to make. p0 are net payments due at closing, in addition to
the fees charged by the broker. They include the downpayment for the loan and lender discount
points. For a renance loan, the amount of cash taken out, if any, would be subtracted.
If the loan is paid o early after m months, Bm denotes the outstanding balance on the mortgage
at that time. If the current loan is renanced after m months, then Bm measures the time-m value
of the payments associated with the new mortgage, including any fees to obtain the renance
mortgage, minus the cash taken out. If the house is sold after m months, Hm = hm and Bm
denotes the outstanding balance on the mortgage minus the sales price. Fm are the costs the
borrower incurs from mortgage default at the end of month m, other than having to give up the
house. Expectations are taken with regard to the joint probability distribution of
(fmg;fhmg;fHmg;fpmg;BTP;FTD;TP;TD): (6)
Consider two borrowers with the same set of observable characteristics who assign the same
value to the outside option of no mortgage but dier in their expectations about the distribution
of the variables in (6). The rst borrower is a benchmark borrower who has objective expectations
about the joint conditional distribution of the variables in (6) and the second borrower is overopti-
mistic. For example, the second borrower may underestimate future payments fpmg, overestimate
8the time until default TD or underestimate the costs associated with mortgage default FTD, or un-
derestimate the net payments BTP associated with renancing the loan or selling the home in the
future. In each of these cases, the overoptimistic borrower's valuation for the loan will be higher
than that of the benchmark borrower. The following is consistent with Scenario 2:
Scenario 2a. Borrowers shop from only one broker. Conditional on a set of observable charac-
teristics, there is an association between overoptimistic borrowers and high mortgage credit risk.
Overoptimistic borrowers pay higher fees and are more risky.
Alternatively, the second borrower may value positive future net benets from living in the
home, hm   pm, more than the benchmark borrower, maybe because the second borrower is more
exposed to income variations that may limit his access to credit and his level of consumption in
future periods. As a result, the second borrower perceives future discount factors m to be higher
than the benchmark borrower, hence pays higher fees. The following is consistent with Scenario 2:
Scenario 2b. Borrowers shop from only one broker. Conditional on a set of observable charac-
teristics, there is an association between high borrower exposure to negative future shocks and high
mortgage credit risk. Borrowers who are more sensitive to negative future shocks pay higher fees
and are more risky.
Suppose that based on the borrower-broker interactions during the bargaining process, brokers
believe that the second borrower will need extra prodding or closer supervision while preparing
the loan documents. As a result they perceive costs to be higher for the second borrower than
for the benchmark borrower. Or suppose that brokers believe that the second borrower is riskier
than the benchmark borrower, and that brokers assign higher reservation values for conditionally
riskier borrowers to compensate for the potential loss of reputation with the lender. The following
is consistent with Scenario 2:
Scenario 2c. Borrowers shop from more than one broker. Conditional on a set of observable
characteristics, there is an association between high broker costs and high mortgage credit risk.
Borrowers for whom brokers perceive costs to be higher pay higher fees and are more risky.
If the second borrower assigns the same joint distribution to the variables in (6) as the bench-
mark borrower, and if brokers assign equal costs to both borrowers, both borrowers will pay the
same fee unless they dier in their shopping eorts. The following is consistent with Scenario 2:
Scenario 2d. Conditional on a set of observable characteristics, borrowers have the same valuation
9for the loan and brokers perceive costs to be the same across borrowers. There is an association
between low shopping eorts and high mortgage credit risk. Borrowers who shop from fewer brokers
pay higher fees and are more risky.
Now suppose that Hypothesis 2 is rejected in favor of the hypothesis that high conditional
fees are associated with low delinquency risk. Then the roles of riskier and safer borrowers in
Scenario 2 must be reversed. Consider a scenario where both the benchmark and the second
borrower introduced above shop from only one broker. The second borrower assigns the same
distribution to the variables in (6) as the benchmark borrower except that he expects to default
sooner based on information available to him but not the lender. The second borrower expects to
draw benets from the home for a shorter period of time. He pays a lower fee but is more risky.
Lastly, we consider the link between yield spread premia and delinquency risk. Our inspection of
various lender rate sheets suggests that lenders set YSP as a function of observable characteristics,
such as the loan type, documentation level, borrower credit history and the mortgage rate.5 As
long as that is the case, there is no unobserved heterogeneity in YSP and the following holds:
Hypothesis 3. Conditional on a set of observable characteristics, YSP has no predictive power
for mortgage credit risk.
In what follows, we describe the data and investigate whether they support the posted hypotheses.
3. The New Century Loan Pool
Our dataset is obtained from IPRecovery, Inc. and contains detailed records of all loans originated
by New Century Financial Corporation. New Century made its rst loan to a borrower in Los
Angeles in 1996 and subsequently grew into one of the top three U.S. subprime lenders. It originated,
retained, sold and serviced residential mortgages designed for subprime borrowers. An increase in
early delinquencies in late 2006 and early 2007, together with inadequate reserves for such losses,
led to New Century' s bankruptcy ling on April 2, 2007.
New Century's origination volume grew from less than 1 billion in 1997 to almost 60 billion in
2006. The explosive growth in volume was largely fueled by independent mortgage broker activity.
Between 1997 and 2006, over 70% of all New Century loans were originated through the broker
channel. This is consistent with the pattern observed for the broader subprime market, where prior
5While the econometrician observes these characteristics and the YSP, the econometrician may not know the
functional form that the lender uses to link the two. Depending on the model that the econometrician uses to control
for variation in observable characteristics and the amount of data available, predicted yield spread premia may deviate
somewhat from observed yield spread premia.
10to the subprime crisis mortgage brokers had become the predominant channel for loan origination.
For example, as of 2005 mortgage brokers originated about 71% of all subprime loans.6 Focusing
on broker-originated loans allows us to abstract from dierences in the compensation structure of
brokers and loan ocers, while still capturing the vast majority of New Century's business. Table 1
denes the variables used in our empirical analysis. Appendix A oers a detailed description of
New Century's origination and servicing data and describes the steps we take to clean the raw data.
In what follows, we compare New Century's origination activity to that of other subprime lenders.
[Table 1 about here]
3.1. Origination data and loan performance
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the broker-originated loans funded by New Century
between 1997 and 2006. We compare them to the statistics reported in Demyanyk and Van Hemert
(2011) for the First American CoreLogic LoanPerformance (LP) data. The LP data contain loan-
level origination and servicing records for roughly 85% of all securitized subprime mortgages and
oer the widest coverage of subprime loans available.7 One drawback of the LP data is that they
do not identify brokered loans nor report broker charges. Nevertheless, we use the LP data as a
benchmark to compare New Century's loan pool to the broader subprime market.
[Table 2 about here]
In the LP data, the average FICO score for rst-lien loans rose from a low of 601 in 2001 to
a high of 621 in 2005. In our sample, average FICO scores for rst-lien loans increased from 585
to 622 over the same time period. The average loan size increased from 126K in 2001 to 212K in
2006 in the LP data, and from 149K to 217K in our data. The percentage of xed-rate, balloon
and other mortgages ranged from 33%, 7% and 60% in 2001 to 20%, 25% and 55% in 2006 in the
LP data, and from 19%, 0% and 81% to 14%, 40% and 46% in the New Century sample.8 Average
combined loan-to-value ratios (CLTVs) are in almost perfect alignment between our and the LP
data, from just below 80% in 2001 to 86% in 2006. Debt-to-income ratios are fairly 
at and around
40% in both samples. The distribution of the loan purpose for New Century loans is similar to that
reported for the LP data. The same is true for mortgage rates, rate margins, and the fraction of
loans with prepayment penalties.
6Detailed information is available at the Mortgage Bankers Association website www.mortgagebankers.org.
7During our sample period, securitization shares of subprime mortgages ranged between 54% and 76% (Mortgage
Market Statistical Annual (2007)).
8For New Century and many other subprime lenders, the share of interest-only loans started to increase in 2004
and that of balloon loans in 2005 (Gorton (2010), Landier, Thesmar, and Sraer (2011)).
11Like other subprime lenders, New Century had three levels of income documentation: full,
limited and stated. For a full documentation loan, the applicant was required to submit two
written forms of income verication showing stable income for at least twelve months. With limited
documentation, the prospective borrower was generally required to submit six months of bank
statements. For stated documentation loans, verication of the amount of monthly income the
applicant stated on the loan application was not required, and these mortgages were often referred
to as \liar loans." The share of loans with full documentation fell from 77% in 2001 to 62% in 2006
in the LP data, but stayed fairly 
at, around 60%, in the New Century data. If we were to combine
full and limited documentation loans in the New Century data, the fraction would fall from 64%
to 60%. Overall, the origination statistics for the New Century loans in our sample are in line with
those for the broader subprime market.
From 1999 onwards, the IPRecovery data contain detailed servicing records for most of the New
Century loans. For every year from 1999 to 2006, more than 99% of the funded broker loans are
part of the servicing data, except for 2001 (83%) and 2002 (42%). As in Demyanyk and Van Hemert
(2011) and Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2011), we consider a loan to be delinquent if payments on
the loan are 60 days or more late, or if the loan is in foreclosure, real estate owned, or in default.
A report by Moody's (2005) shows that the performance of New Century loans closely tracked
that of the subprime industry. We conrm this nding by comparing the cumulative delinquency
rates for our data, as shown in Figure 1, with those reported by Demyanyk and Van Hemert
(2011). For the LP (New Century) data, 12-month cumulative delinquency rates are 13% (20%),
9% (13.5%), 7.5% (8.5%), 9% (10%) and 12% (13%) for loans originated in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
and 2005, respectively. These delinquency statistics are rather similar, especially for the latter part
of the sample. The only two years with larger dierences in rates are 2001 and 2002, precisely the
years in which a sizable portion of the New Century loans are missing from the servicing data. Given
the lack of data, we put less weight on the 2001 and 2002 estimates and verify that our empirical
ndings are robust to excluding loans originated prior to 2003. The 2003-2005 delinquency rates
reported for the LP data are about 1% lower than those for our sample perhaps because the LP
data include retail loans in addition to broker loans. Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2011) nd that
retail loans are generally safer than broker loans.
[Figure 1 about here]
3.2. Broker charges
Until recently, independent mortgage brokers earned revenues from two sources: a direct fee
paid by the borrower and an indirect fee|the YSP|paid by the lender. Direct fees include all
12compensation associated with the mortgage transaction paid by the borrower directly to the broker,
including nance charges such as appraisal and credit report fees. The YSP rewards the broker for
originating loans with higher mortgage rates, holding other things equal.9 Table 3 shows that total
broker revenues per loan, as a percentage of loan amount, declined steadily from 4.9% in 1997 to
2.8% in 2006. The decline in percentage revenues was almost equally split between a decline in fees
and in YSP. Dollar revenues per loan, on the other hand, increased over time from 4.2K in 1997
to 5.6K in 2006. The increase in dollar revenues corresponds to an annual compound rate of 3.3%
which is similar to the rate of in
ation. The decrease in percentage revenues and the relatively
modest growth in dollar revenues may re
ect an increase in broker competition over time.
[Table 3 about here]
The top panel in Figure 2 shows the unconditional distribution of broker revenues and its two
components.10 All three distributions are disperse and skewed to the right: some very large fees
and yield spread premia were paid out to brokers. The right skewness in the revenue distribution
appears to be a robust feature across dierent strata of our sample, as documented in the remaining
panels in Figure 2, although the skewness is smaller after conditioning on the loan amount.
[Figure 2 about here]
The rst column in the bottom panel of Table 3 reveals that brokers are generally rewarded
more for originating larger loans. While brokers earn an average 2.2K per loan for mortgages of
50K or less, they earn 9.7K for loans in excess of 500K. Both direct fees and YSP contribute to
the increase in revenues as loan amount increases. After controlling for the size of the loan, there
is much less variation in revenues. Nevertheless, hybrid loans usually generate lower revenues than
xed-rate, balloon and interest-only loans. Borrowers with a lower FICO score often pay higher fees
and yield spread premia compared to higher-credit-quality borrowers. Loans with a prepayment
penalty generally yield higher broker revenues, mainly due to higher fees.
9New loan originator compensation rules went in eect April 1, 2011 as part of Regulation Z. They prohibit
mortgage broker compensation to vary based on loan terms, other than principal. In particular, brokers can no
longer receive yield spread premia from the lender.
10About 27% of the YSP entries in our data are left blank. All else the same, loans with lower FICO scores, lower
risk grades and less documentation are more likely to have a missing YSP entry. Such loans usually have high base
rates, leaving less room for brokers to convince borrowers to pay rates in excess of the base rate. Moreover, while
an increase in YSP is usually associated with a decrease in direct broker fees, we nd no statistical signicance for
a missing-YSP dummy when regressing broker fees on YSP and other observable covariates. With this in mind, we
interpret missing-YSP entries as zero YSP, which brings the percentage of zero-YSP loans in our data to 30%. Our
ndings are robust, however, to excluding missing-YSP loans from the sample.
13During our sample period, almost 56,000 dierent brokerage rms do business with New Cen-
tury. Each company consists of one or more individuals working out of the same oce. The median
brokerage rm has only sporadic contact with New Century, and originates about 4 loans or 734K
for this lender between 1997 and 2006. The top three loan originators in our sample are Worth
Funding (9,705 loans), United Vision Financial (2,826 loans) and Dana Capital Group (1,446 loans).
Our results are robust to excluding loans originated by these three brokerage rms from the data.
Two recent studies report data on broker fees and yield spread premia. Woodward and Hall
(2012) analyze about 1,500 FHA xed-rate loans originated during a 6-week period in 2001 and
report average broker revenues of about 4.1K per loan and an average loan size of about 113K. In
percentage terms this is comparable to the 2001 statistics we report in Tables 2 and 3, although
our dollar values are somewhat higher both for revenues (4.8K) and loan size (149K). Garmaise
(2009) studies a sample of almost 24,000 residential single-family mortgages originated between
2004 and 2008. He reports average percentage broker revenues of 2.1%. Neither study, however,
focuses on subprime loans. A news release by 360 Mortgage Group (Reuters (2011)) on mortgage
broker compensation states that brokers generated an average revenue of 2.25% per loan in recent
years.11 This gure is consistent with the compensation statistics reported in Table 3 and points
to a continued decline in percentage revenues beyond 2006.
In summary, New Century's loan pool is largely representative of the broader subprime market.
Following its bankruptcy ling in 2007, New Century received widespread attention in the popular
press, mainly because it was the largest subprime lender to default by that date. By 2009, however,
virtually all of New Century's main competitors had either declared bankruptcy, had been absorbed
into other lenders, or had otherwise unwound their lending activities.12
3.3. Broker charges and mortgage rates
In Section 1 we assume that broker fees can be set without a feedback eect on other terms
of the loan. To conrm that there are no economically meaningful feedback eects from fees to
mortgage rates we estimate the regression model
Rate =  + F %Fees + Y %YSP + e Xcond 0
cond + "; (7)
11The news release does not distinguish between prime and subprime mortgage brokers.
12New Century was joined on the OCC's 2009 list of the biggest subprime lenders in main metro areas by Long Beach
Mortgage, Argent Mortgage, WMC Mortgage, Fremont Investment & Loan, Option One Mortgage, First Franklin,
Countrywide, Ameriquest Mortgage, ResMae Mortgage, American Home Mortgage, IndyMac Bank, Greenpoint
Mortgage Funding, Wells Fargo, Ownit Mortgage Solutions, Aegis Funding, Peoples Choice Financial, BNC Mortgage,
Fieldstone Mortgage, Decision One Mortgage and Delta Funding.
14where , F and Y are scalars and cond is a row vector of coecients. The vector of condition-
ing variables e Xcond consists of all observable characteristics other than fees, YSP and the initial
mortgage rate (\Rate"). It includes loan, property, borrower, broker, neighborhood and regulation
variables, market conditions, and year and location dummies. Some of the continuous conditioning
variables are discretized to add 
exibility to the linear specication in Equation (7).
The results are summarized in Table 4. For F = Y = 0, the regression in (7) yields an R2
of 0.78. If we include percentage YSP in the regression but keep F at zero, the R2 increases to
0.85. A marginal increase in percentage YSP by 1% is associated with a signicant 52 basis point
increase in the initial rate. A one standard deviation increase in percentage YSP is associated with
a 40 basis point increase in rates. Our results are consistent with the notion that, all else the same,
lenders pay higher YSP for mortgages with higher rates. When fees are included in the regression,
the estimate for F is 0.006. While the coecient estimate is statistically signicant, a marginal
increase in percentage fees by 1% is associated with only a very small 0.6 basis point increase in
rates. A one standard deviation increase in percentage fees is associated with an equally small 0.8
basis point increase in rates. The results conrm that, based on our data, there are no economically
meaningful feedback eects from fees to mortgage rates.
[Table 4 about here]
4. Broker Charges Predict Mortgage Credit Risk
In this section, we establish that higher broker revenues re
ect higher delinquency risk, both un-
conditionally and when conditioning on observable characteristics. We present evidence in support
of Hypotheses 1 and 3 in Section 2. The main result is that Hypothesis 2 is rejected in favor of the
hypothesis that borrowers pay high conditional fees for loans that turn out to be riskier ex post.
4.1. The unconditional link between broker charges and mortgage credit risk
The left panel in Figure 3 shows average 12-month delinquency rates for loans sorted by per-
centage broker revenues. Delinquency rates are lowest|about 10%|for loans with percentage
revenues of 1-2%. They increase steadily as percentage revenues increase, and peak at over 19% for
loans with percentage revenues of more than 5%. The average 12-month delinquency rate for loans
with percentage revenues of less than 1% is slightly higher than that for loans with 1-2% revenues,
consistent with somewhat higher delinquency rates among very large, low percentage revenue loans
and also consistent with some extremely cash constrained borrowers obtaining small-cost loans.
15Overall, however, the data support Hypothesis 1 that loans with high percentage revenues are
riskier than loans with low percentage revenues.
[Figure 3 about here]
The link between percentage revenues and mortgage credit risk may hold because revenues
proxy for other risk characteristics. Consistent with Scenario 1 described in Section 2, we nd that
percentage revenues are larger for smaller loans. As shown in the middle panel of Figure 3, average
percentage revenues decline steadily as the loan size increases, from 4.4% for 50-75K loans to 2.2%
for loans between 300K and 500K. At the same time, the right panel in the gure shows that
small loans are generally also the riskier ones. The average 12-month delinquency rate is highest
for 50-75K loans at almost 19%, and then decreases as loan size increases to a low of 11.4% for
200-300K loans. 300-500K loans are again slightly riskier, with a delinquency rate of 11.8%.
Small loan size|and hence high percentage revenues|serve as strong unconditional indicators
of high delinquency risk. In our data, smaller loans are often taken out by lower-income, lower-
FICO-score borrowers who tend to purchase or renance homes in neighborhoods with a higher
percentage of minorities and a lower percentage of college graduates.
4.2. The conditional link between broker charges and mortgage credit risk
While variables such as loan size predict broker revenues, we nd substantial variation in rev-
enues even after controlling for observable characteristics. Table 4 shows that observable charac-
teristics explain 50.7% of the variation in dollar revenues and 41.9% of the variation in percentage
revenues. Broker fees are harder to predict than revenues. Only 40.5% of the variation in dollar
fees and 37.8% of the variation in percentage fees can be explained by observable characteristics.
Residual fees are skewed to the right, with a skewness coecient of 0.50 for dollar fees and 0.53 for
percentage fees. A sizable fraction of borrowers pay high conditional fees.
Much of the observed variation in broker fees is explained by the loan amount which, by itself,
yields an R2 of 26.7% for dollar fees and 22.1% for percentage fees. Controlling for YSP in addition
to size increases the R2 for dollar and percentage fees to 32.4% and 25.4%, respectively. A marginal
increase in YSP is only partially oset by lower fees, consistent with Woodward (2003).
We want to understand what the unexplained variation in broker charges reveals about mort-
gage credit risk. Dierent approaches have been used in the literature to predict delinquency risk.
A large number of studies apply a duration model methodology and follow Deng (1997), Ambrose
and Capone (2000) and Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) who employ Cox proportional haz-
16ard models.13 Proportional hazard models are appealing not only because they allow for 
exible
default patterns over time but also because they oer a convenient way to incorporate censored
observations. An alternative approach is to estimate a probit model as in Danis and Pennigton-
Cross (2005), Geradi, Goette, and Meier (2010) and Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2011). While
duration models capture the time between loan origination and credit event, probit models do not
distinguish between mortgages that become delinquent at dierent points in time.
A loan transitions from survival to nonsurvival when it becomes 60 days delinquent or worse
for the rst time. Since mortgage payments are due on a monthly basis, credit events occur only at
discrete points in time (Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011)). To establish a link between conditional
broker charges and delinquency risk we estimate a proportional odds duration model, the discrete-
time analogue to the Cox proportional hazard model. For a loan with a given set X of observable
characteristics, the probability that the loan transitions to the nonsurvival state after m months,
conditional on not having been delinquent before, is dened as
PX(m) = Pr(TD = mjTD  m;X);
where TD denotes the time of the credit event.




= am + Xcompb0
comp + Xcondb0
cond; (8)
where am captures age eects and bcomp and bcond are row vectors of coecients. The vector X
consists of broker compensation variables, Xcomp, and all other observable characteristics including
mortgage rates, Xcond.14 The model is estimated via maximum likelihood techniques under the
noninformative censoring assumption.
The estimation results are summarized in Table 5. The rst two columns show the parameter
estimates when bcomp = 0. Our results are consistent with the ndings in Demyanyk and Van
13Applications of Cox proportional hazard models include Calhoun and Deng (2002), Pennington-Cross
(2003), Deng, Pavlov, and Yang (2005), Clapp, Deng, and An (2006), Pennington-Cross and Chomsisengphet (2007)
and Bajari, Chu, and Park (2011), among others. Some models allow for 
exible baseline functions (see Han and
Hausman (1990), Sueyoshi (1992) and McCall (1996)).
14The vector Xcond is composed of e Xcond in Equation (7) and the mortgage rate. Whether or not to include
rates depends on the objective of the loan performance analysis. Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) argue that
subprime loan quality, when adjusted for observable characteristics including rates, deteriorated prior to the subprime
crisis. Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2011) predict rst-time delinquency rates for dierent origination channels and
documentation levels. They exclude mortgage rates from the set of predictor variables to avoid endogeneity issues.
In our applications, we are interested to understand if broker charges predict delinquency risk when conditioning on
all other observable characteristics including mortgage rates.
17Hemert (2011) and Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2011). All else the same, hybrid, balloon and
interest-only loans tend to have higher delinquency rates than xed-rate loans. Piggyback loans,
high-LTV loans, limited or stated documentation loans, and loans with prepay penalties are more
likely to become delinquent. Renance mortgages, and especially renance cash-out mortgages, are
less likely to become delinquent. Borrowers with higher credit scores and lower debt-to-income ratios
default less frequently on their obligations. Loans originated in neighborhoods with a higher fraction
of white population or with higher educational attainment exhibit marginally lower delinquency
rates. The unreported age eects are consisted with the ndings in Demyanyk and Van Hemert
(2011) in that the odds of rst-time delinquency peak around the age of 8 to 14 months. Conditional
delinquency rates increase throughout much of our sample period and peak in 2006.
[Table 5 about here]
The vector Xcond also includes state-by-state regulation variables. HOEPA sets a baseline for
federal regulation of the mortgage market. We follow the approach taken by Ho and Pennington-
Cross (2005) and Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006) and construct a \Regulation (coverage)" index
that assigns higher positive values if anti-predatory lending laws for a given state cover more
types of mortgages relative to HOEPA. In addition, we use the state occupational licensing laws
and registration policies for mortgage brokers reported by Pahl (2007) to construct a \Regulation
(brokers, Pahl)" index that has higher values for states with stricter requirements.
We nd only slightly lower marginal delinquency rates for loans originated in states where a
wider range of mortgages is covered under anti-predatory lending laws, but signicantly lower rates
in states with a higher Pahl index of broker regulation. Stricter broker licensing laws predict lower
mortgage credit risk, even when conditioning on other observable risk characteristics.
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 show the estimation results when the restriction
bcomp = 0 is lifted and Xcomp measures percentage broker revenues. A marginal increase in broker
revenues by 1% of the loan amount is associated with a 0.062 higher log odds ratio of rst-time
delinquency, or a exp(0:062)-1=6.4% higher odds ratio. A one standard deviation increase in
percentage revenues is associated with a 0.091 increase in the log odds ratio.
A marginal increase in revenues may stem from a marginal increase in fees or a marginal increase
in YSP. We replace Xcompb0
comp by bF%Fees+ bY %YSP and report the results in columns ve and
six of Table 5. The coecient estimate b bF for percentage fees is statistically signicant. A marginal
increase in fees by 1% of the loan amount is associated with a 0.073 higher log odds ratio, or 7.6%
higher odds of delinquency. A one standard deviation increase in percentage fees is associated with
a 0.097 increase in the log odds ratio.
18We reject Hypothesis 2 in Section 2 that conditional fees are unrelated to mortgage credit risk,
and nd that high conditional fees are associated with high delinquency risk. Scenario 2 interprets
our ndings in light of Equation (4). Scenarios 2a through 2d are all consistent with the empirical
evidence, and based on the data available to us it is not possible to rule out one or more of these
scenarios. In particular, we have no information about the shopping eorts of the borrowers in our
sample and we cannot directly observe the borrowers' valuation for the loan nor the brokers' costs.
The only two surveys of borrowers' shopping eorts that we are aware o, Lacko and Pappalardo
(2007) and Federal Reserve Board (2008), nd that many but not all borrowers shop from only one
broker. In any case, we believe that it is a combination of Scenarios 2a through 2d that contributes
to the link between conditional broker fees and delinquency risk that we uncover.
Lastly, the coecient estimate b bY for percentage YSP is not statistically signicant. The data
supports Hypothesis 3 that conditional on a set of observable characteristics, YSP has no predictive
power for mortgage credit risk. It is important to point out that this does not imply that there
is no link between YSP and loan performance. On the contrary, all else the same, more complex
loans and loans with a prepayment penalty tend to have higher YSP and higher delinquency rates.
5. Robustness and Extensions
We perform a number of robustness checks to strengthen our main result that high conditional
fees are associated with high delinquency risk. First, we address the issue of collinearity between
percentage fees and other predictor variables in Equation (8). We reestimate the model in the last
two columns of Table 5 after replacing percentage fees by the residuals obtained from regressing
percentage fees on percentage YSP and Xcond.15 Untabulated results show that the coecient
estimate for residual percentage fees is statistically signicant, and that a one standard deviation
increase in residual percentage fees is associated with a 8.0% increase in the odds of delinquency.
Second, we form a number of homogeneous loan pools, based on the vintage, size and type
of the loan, the borrower's credit quality and the mortgage rate. For each of the resulting loan
pools, Table 6 reports the average 12-month delinquency rates for those loans in the pool with low
percentage fees and for those with high percentage fees. For most pools, the delinquency rate is
higher for loans with high percentage fees and lower for loans with low percentage fees. Third, we
reestimate the model in the last two columns of Table 5 for dierent strata of loans. Results are
summarized in the bottom panel of Table 6 and conrm the nding that high conditional broker
15The last two columns of Table 4 show the results from regressing percentage fees on percentage YSP and Xcond.
19fees predict high mortgage credit risk.
[Table 6 about here]
Below we discuss extensions to the model in (8) that uses Xcompb0
comp = bF%Fees + bY %YSP.
5.1. Do high broker fees trigger mortgage delinquencies?
One goal is to understand whether loans with higher conditional fees turn out to be more
risky simply because paying a higher fee at origination leaves borrowers more cash constrained,
or whether borrowers who pay higher fees are inherently more risky. If the former were true, the
eect of an increase in conditional fees on delinquency risk should be short lived and the impact of
conditional fees on the odds of a rst-time delinquency in month m should decrease as m increases.




= am + (bF + bF;m) %Fees + bY %YSP + Xcondb0
cond; bF;15 = 0: (9)
The likelihood ratio test of the augmented model in (9) against the restricted model in (8) that
sets bF;m = 0 for all m has a p-value of 0.472. Hence the following hypothesis cannot be rejected:
Hypothesis 4. Conditional on a set of observable characteristics, an increase in percentage fees
is associated with a parallel shift in the log odds of rst-time delinquency in month m, across m.
We interpret the failure to reject Hypothesis 4 as a strong indication that borrowers who pay higher
conditional fees are inherently more risky.
5.2. Screening incentives of lenders
Lenders observe the information provided on the loan application. We think of this informa-
tion as \hard" information about the borrower. Lenders may exert additional eorts to screen
applicants for \soft" information such as the stability of the borrower's future income. A lender
screens a borrower if the lender bases the funding decision on both hard and soft information. Keys,
Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2009) and Bubb and Kaufman (2009) argue that during our sample pe-
riod, subprime lenders had less incentive to screen borrowers with high FICO scores than borrowers
with low FICO scores.
Bubb and Kaufman (2009) explain that lenders who sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac were
contractually obligated to follow guidelines that required increased scrutiny of loan applications
below certain thresholds. Freddie Mac (1995) and Fannie Mae (1997) established FICO scores
20of 620 and 660 as key cutos. For borrowers with FICO scores above 660, lenders were to do
a basic review of the loan application to conrm the borrower's ability to repay. For loans with
FICO scores between 620 and 660, lenders were to perform a comprehensive review to underwrite
all aspects of the borrower's credit history and to establish the borrower's ability to repay. For
FICO scores below 620, lenders were to perform a particularly detailed review of the borrower's
credit history and consider the unique circumstances of each application, such as information about
non-standard sources of income, cash reserves and the borrower's explanation of recent income or
payment shocks, to judge if there are compensating factors that oset the higher risk. According
to Bubb and Kaufman (2009), this process was followed not only for loans sold to Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac but also for portfolio loans and loans sold to private-label securitizers.
Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2009) nd that prior to the subprime crisis existing securiti-
zation practices had led to a decrease in the screening incentives of lenders. For limited and stated
documentation loans, they argue that loans made to borrowers with a FICO score above 620 had
a higher unconditional likelihood of being securitized than loans made to borrowers with a FICO
score below 620, and that as a result lenders had less incentive to carefully screen borrowers above
the 620 FICO score threshold. For full documentation loans, they identify a FICO score of 600 as
a signicant threshold for ease of securitization.
If lenders screen borrowers more carefully, they are more likely to learn about otherwise un-
observed borrower attributes linked to delinquency risk. If more information about the borrower
results in mortgage rates that are higher for riskier borrowers, then more thorough screening should
weaken the association between conditional fees and delinquency risk. We post the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. Conditional on a set of observable characteristics, an increase in fees is associated
with an increase in the log odds of delinquency that is smaller for low FICO loans and larger for
high FICO loans.
To test this hypothesis, we expand the specication in Equation (8) to allow for interaction









F 1fLow doc, FICO range kg %Fees + bY %YSP: (10)
Low documentation loans include limited and stated documentation loans. FICO ranges 1 through
4 are dened as FICO < 600, FICO 2 [600;620), FICO 2 [620;660) and FICO  600, respectively.
The results are reported in Table 7. Independent of the documentation level, a marginal increase
in percentage fees tends to have a larger impact on the log odds ratio of delinquency for loans with
21higher FICO scores than for loans with lower FICO scores.
[Table 7 about here]
An increase in percentage fees by 1% is more likely, however, for low-FICO-score loans than for
high-FICO-score loans. For full documentation loans, the sample standard deviation of percentage
fees ranges from 1.40% for loans with a FICO score of less than 600 (600  loans) to 1.28% for loans
with a FICO score of 660 or higher (660+ loans). A one standard deviation increase in percentage
fees translates to a 0.084 increase in the log odds ratio for 600  loans and a 0.183 increase for
660+ loans. For low documentation loans, standard deviations range from 1.38% for 600  loans
to 1.12% for 660+ loans. A one standard deviation increase in percentage fees amounts to a 0.059
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F 1fLow doc, FICO range kg%Fees is replaced in a similar fashion, untabulated results
show that the increase in the %Fees coecient is signicant at the 600 and the 660 FICO score
threshold, both for full and for low documentation loans. For low documentation loans, the estimate
for ~ bl;3 is also positive although it is not statistically signicant.
We also estimate the model in (10) after stratifying the data by documentation level and FICO
range. We obtain coecient estimates for percentage fees that follow a similar pattern as that for
the estimates reported in Table 7. For full documentation loans and FICO score ranges 1, 2, 3 and
4, a one standard deviation increase in percentage fees is associated with a 0.058, 0.146, 0.109 and
0.188 increase in the log odds ratio of rst-time delinquency. For low documentation loans, the
corresponding estimates are 0.061, 0.084, 0.169 and 0.236.
Overall, our results support Hypothesis 5 and are consistent with a stronger association between
conditional fees and delinquency risk when lenders have less incentive to carefully screen borrowers.
5.3. Loan purpose
Credit reports contain specic information on borrowers' payment pattern for previous mort-
gages. As a result, more housing-related information is available about borrowers who renance an
existing loan than about borrowers who purchase a home for the rst time.16 In addition, renance
16Jaee (2008) reports that the borrower was a rst-time homebuyer for one out of ve home purchases in the
subprime mortgage market between 2000 and 2006.
22loans tend to have a lower combined loan-to-value ratio than purchase loans.17 This implies that
borrowers who renance an existing mortgage tend to have more money invested in the home than
borrowers who purchase a home. Borrowers with sizable down payments have a strong incentive to
stay current on their mortgage payments, especially in situations where house prices have declined.
In comparison, borrowers who lay out no or little cash at origination have less \skin in the game"
and may be more heterogeneous in their attitude towards delinquency risk.
We conjecture that less housing-related information and more heterogeneity in borrower atti-
tudes towards delinquency risk result in a stronger link between conditional fees and delinquency
risk for purchase loans than for renance loans:
Hypothesis 6. Conditional on a set of observable characteristics, an increase in fees is associated
with an increase in the log odds of delinquency that is larger for purchase loans and smaller for
renance loans.
We reestimate the model in (8) with interaction terms between fees, documentation level, FICO
score and loan purpose. We set Xcompb0

































1fLow d,high FICOg: (11)
For full documentation loans, low FICO loans are those with a FICO score below 600. For low
documentation loans, low FICO loans are those with a FICO score below 620. We interact fees
with the documentation level and FICO score to condition on the screening incentives of lenders.
The results are reported in Table 7 and support Hypothesis 6. For any given level of screening
incentives, the coecient estimates for percentage fees in (11) are higher for purchase loans than
for renance loans. We replace b
f;l;p
F 1fpurchg + b
f;l;r
F 1freg by ~ b
f;l
F + ~ b
f;l;r
F 1freg and verify that the
decrease in the fees coecient from purchase to renance loans is statistically signicant. The same
holds true for the remaining combinations of documentation level and FICO score.
The bottom panel of Table 6 reports estimates for the model in (8) after stratifying the data by
documentation level, FICO score and loan purpose. The coecient estimates for percentage fees
are again higher for purchase loans, oering additional support for Hypothesis 6.
17In our sample, renance and purchase loans have an average CLTV of 79% and 94%, respectively.
235.4. Broker activity
We refer to brokers who have frequent interactions with a given lender|in our case New
Century|as \active brokers" as opposed to \inactive brokers." Active brokers may value their
relationship with the lender more than inactive brokers, and hence may be more concerned about
the performance of the loans they originate. As a consequence, active brokers may transmit more
precise information regarding the borrower's ability to repay the loan to the lender, and may reveal
soft information they collect during their negotiations with the borrower. If closer broker-lender
relationships result in mortgage rates that are higher for riskier borrowers, then the link between
conditional fees and delinquency risk should be weaker for loans originated by active brokers:
Hypothesis 7. Conditional on a set of observable characteristics, an increase in fees is associated
with an increase in the log odds of delinquency that is smaller for loans originated by an active
broker and larger for loans originated by an inactive broker.
We reestimate the model in (8) with interaction terms between fees, documentation level, FICO
score and broker activity. At any given point in time, active brokers are those that submitted ve
or more loan applications to New Century in the previous month.18 Xcompb0
comp is specied as in
Section 5.3, except that the identiers for purchase loans and for renance loans in (11) are replaced
by identiers for inactive-broker-originated loans and for active-broker-originated loans.
The results are reported in Table 7 and support Hypothesis 7. For any given level of screening
incentives, the coecient estimates for percentage fees are higher for inactive-broker-originated
loans than for active-broker-originated loans. The decrease in the fees coecient from loans by
inactive brokers to loans by active brokers is statistically signicant, except for low documentation
low-FICO-score loans. The bottom panel of Table 6 reports estimates for the model in (8) after
stratifying the data by documentation level, FICO score and broker activity. A one standard
deviation increase in percentage fees is associated with an increase in the log odds of delinquency
that is smaller for loans originated by an active broker and larger for loans originated by an inactive
broker, oering additional support for Hypothesis 7.
18About one-third of the loans in our sample are originated by active brokers. For each broker, New Century also
tracked the volume of loan applications submitted, and the number and volume of loan applications funded, in the
previous month. Our ndings are robust to using any of these alternative measures of broker activity.
246. Estimating Marginal Broker Costs
Can the empirical link between broker charges and delinquency risk that we document be used by
lenders or regulators? Consider a new broker-revenue-based rate schedule:




r( e X); if % broker revenue   R( e X)
 r( e X)  r( e X); if % broker revenue >  R( e X);
(12)
where e X = e Xcond denotes the vector of observable characteristics excluding fees, YSP and the
mortgage rate. If the threshold  R( e X) is a constant, then (12) re
ects the unconditional link
between percentage broker revenues and mortgage credit risk. If  R( e X) is equal to some benchmark
revenue for loans with characteristics e X, then (12) re
ects the conditional link between percentage
revenues and delinquency risk.
Under the rate schedule (12), a borrower who pays percentage fees plus percentage YSP, if
any, in excess of  R would have to pay the higher rate  r.19 But if  r is so high that the borrower's
reservation value for the fees as a percentage of loan amount falls below  R %YSP, the broker would
not be able to collect revenues in excess of  R and may decide to originate the loan at the lower rate
r. Whether or not the rate schedule (12) would be successful in charging higher rates for riskier
loans depends, among other things, on the interest rate sensitivity of the borrower's valuation for
the loan, of the borrower's shopping eorts and of the broker's costs.
We do not speculate how the introduction of a revenue-based rate schedule may impact the
outcome of future borrower-broker interactions or how r and  r should be set. Instead, we observe
that given (12) borrowers would either have to pay the higher rate  r or forego the loan whenever
the broker's percentage costs for the low-rate loan exceed  R. Identifying borrowers who take out
high percentage cost loans allows us to characterize a subset of borrowers who would no longer
have access to low mortgage rates. Since broker costs are not observable, we outline our estimation
strategy below. In Section 7, we discuss current regulatory eorts that propose a constant threshold
 R. In Appendix B, we describe two alternative approaches to protecting lenders from unobserved
borrower risk.
To derive cost estimates, consider a borrower i and a broker j who bargain over the fees for
some loan (L;r). The broker's cost is given by ci;j = ci;j(Xi;Xj), where Xi denotes the vector
of observable characteristics other than fees, YSP and broker-specic variables. Broker-specic
variables are collected in Xj. In our applications, Xj is a binary \active broker" variable that
19To keep notation simple, we drop the conditioning variable e X.
25equals one if the loan is originated by an active broker as denied in Section 5.4, an zero otherwise.20
For the loans in our data, Equation (4) relates broker revenues to costs as a function of the
borrower's shopping behavior. While we do not observe borrowers' shopping eorts, Lacko and
Pappalardo (2007) and a Federal Reserve Board (2008) survey nd that many but not all borrowers
shop from only one broker. For a given set of observable characteristics Xi and Xj, and holding
YSP xed, the revenue distribution dened by (4) is a mixture of two unknown distributions|those
of broker costs and of borrowers' valuation for the loan|with unknown proportions. Estimating
costs from observed revenues therefore requires strong parametric assumptions.
As a tradeo between the need for loan-level cost estimates and the pitfalls of model misspec-
ication, we consider a range of cost specications spanned by two polar cases. In the rst case,
the broker's cost ci;j is set equal to the minimum revenue observed for loans with characteristics Xi
and Xj, c(Xi;Xj). Provided some loans with characteristics Xi and Xj are intermediated at cost,
c(Xi;Xj) is a lower bound on conditional costs and ci;j = c(Xi;Xj) is consistent with a scenario
where borrowers shop from a single broker (K = 1) and where there is no unobserved heterogeneity
in costs. We refer to the rst case as the perfect rent extraction case.
In the second case, the broker's cost ci;j is set equal to the observed revenue. Revenues provide
an upper bound on costs, as dictated by the broker's participation constraint in (1). The case
ci;j = revenuei;j is consistent with a scenario where borrowers shop from multiple brokers (K > 1)
with the same cost. Suppose that costs for borrower i are the same across all brokers of type
Xj, so that ci;j =  c(i;Xi;Xj). If borrowers observe broker types, have a preference for a type
of broker and shop from two or more brokers of that type, loans are intermediated at cost and
ci;j = revenuei;j =  c(i;Xi;Xj). Any unobserved heterogeneity in costs stems from heterogeneity
across borrowers. For example, brokers may learn about borrower attributes that are not disclosed
on the loan application but are likely to aect the brokers' time costs, such as a particular borrower
needing extra prodding or close supervision while preparing the loan documents.21 That said, costs
for a given borrower i may dier across brokers of dierent types. We refer to the second case as
the perfect competition case, short for perfect competition among brokers of the same type.
We consider cost functions of the form
cw
i;j = (1   w)c(Xi;Xj) + w  c(i;Xi;Xj); for w 2 [0;1]; (13)
20The \Broker competition" variable listed under \Broker variables" in Table 1 is measured at the zip-code level
rather than the individual broker level, and is included in Xi.
21Woodward and Hall (2012) do not observe broker characteristics and assume that all unobserved heterogeneity
in broker costs stems from heterogeneity in costs across brokers. As a result, they cannot identify broker costs in
cases where the borrower shops from only one broker.
26where w = 0 corresponds to costs under perfect rent extraction and w = 1 corresponds to costs
under perfect competition. To visualize the range of cost distributions generated by Equation (13),
Figure 4 plots the unconditional cost distributions cw = (1 w)c+w c(i). As w increases from 0 to
1, cost estimates shift from a narrow distribution at small values to more disperse and right-skewed
distributions with some very large values.
[Figure 4 about here]
Given a set of observable characteristics (Xi;Xj),  c(i;Xi;Xj) is observed directly as the broker's
revenue. Minimum conditional revenues c(Xi;Xj) can be approximated in a robust fashion by a
low quantile of the conditional revenue distribution, q(Xi;Xj) for  small (Chernozhukov (2000),






0 is a scalar and 
 is a row vector of coecients. In our applications, the conditioning
variables (Xi;Xj) are the loan, property, borrower and broker characteristics, neighborhood and
regulation variables, market conditions, and year and location dummies listed in Table 5.22
Table 8 presents average cost estimates for dierent values of w. Average dollar costs ranged
from 2.2K per loan for w = 0 to 5.3K for w = 1, whereas average percentage costs ranged from
1.4% for w = 0 to 3.2% for w = 1. While dollar costs showed a moderate increase throughout the
sample period, percentage costs fell sharply. For all values of w, there were sizable costs even for
the smallest loans, consistent with sizable xed costs associated with loan origination. Dollar costs
were increasing and concave in the loan amount, and percentage costs were substantially larger for
smaller loans (see Scenario 1 in Section 2). Average percentage costs ranged from 2.0% for loans
of 50K or less to 0.4% for loans in excess of 500K for w = 0, and from 5.5% to 1.6% for w = 1.
[Table 8 about here]
Table 9 reveals that after conditioning on the size of the loan, the variation in costs was sub-
stantially smaller. Conditional on size, it was slightly more costly to originate more complex loans,
piggyback loans, cash out renance loans, loans for borrowers of lower credit quality, and loans in
neighborhoods with a higher percentage of minorities. Cost estimates were somewhat higher for
22Estimates for 
0 and 
 are available upon request.
27primary residences than for second homes or investment properties, and for loans that are originated
by active versus inactive brokers. Perhaps active brokers were larger brokerage rms with higher
xed costs per loan because they needed to spend more to provide the level of service borrowers
associated with that type of broker, or because they were in markets where it was costlier to keep
new brokers from entering. As a robustness check we reestimate costs for dierent strata of loans
and verify that the estimates are similar to those based on the full sample.
[Table 9 about here]
Marginal broker prots are measured as the dierence between revenues and costs. According
to Table 8, average prots ranged from 3.1K per loan for w = 0 to zero for w = 1. Because the
level of the cost estimates in the perfect competition case seems rather high, and in light of the
evidence in Lacko and Pappalardo (2007) and Federal Reserve Board (2008), we believe that many
of the observed revenues did indeed re
ect positive marginal prots. For w < 1, Table 8 shows
that borrowers who took out larger loans paid substantially higher dollar margins above costs than
borrowers who took out smaller loans. Our ndings suggest that brokers benetted from steering
borrowers towards larger loans, and that brokers may have been willing to expand extra eorts to
attract borrowers who purchase or renance large homes. Conditional on loan size, however, the
variation in prots was substantially smaller (see Table 9).
7. The Impact of Linking Mortgage Rates to Broker Charges
We analyze a regulatory proposal that stipulates broker-revenue-based mortgage pricing and discuss
its potential impact on loan performance, access to mortgage credit and broker compensation.
7.1. The QRM proposal
In response to the fallout from the subprime crisis, Congress enacted credit risk retention
requirements as part of the Dodd-Frank Act. The rulemaking requires issuers of securitizations
to keep \skin in the game" by retaining at least 5% of the credit risk of each securitization.23
Dodd-Frank exempts certain securitizations from the risk retention requirements, including deals
collateralized exclusively by government-backed securities or by Qualied Residential Mortgages.
A proposal for Qualied Residential Mortgage (QRM) guidelines was published in March 2011
(see Appendix C for details). One of the proposed restrictions, QRM Rule 8, stipulates that
23Permissible forms of risk retention include, among others, a vertical slice of the deal's interests where specied
pro rate pieces of each subordination tranche are retained, or a horizontal rst-loss position (Agencies (2011)).
28origination charges payable by the borrower in connection with the mortgage transaction, as dened
in the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Z (12 CFR section 226.4), may not exceed 3% of the
loan amount. Percentage broker revenues are a lower bound for percentage origination charges
(see Appendix C), hence cannot exceed 3% for QRM loans. NAMB (2011), Freedman (2011)
and Zandi and deRitis (2011) predict that borrowers who take out non-QRM loans will have to pay
signicantly higher mortgage rates, by as much as 2-3%. Using revenues as a proxy for origination
charges, this would imply a revenue-based rate schedule as in (12), with  R( ~ X) equal to 3%.
The broker's participation constraint (1) allows us to identify loans in our data that ex post
would not have been able to qualify for QRM status based on Rule 8. Specically, we identify loans
with marginal broker costs in excess of 3% of the loan amount as non-QRM8 loans. Non-QRM8
loans would have violated QRM Rule 8 even if the broker would have foregone any marginal prots.
We refer to all other loans as QRM8 loans. For QRM8 loans, 3% of the loan amount would have
been sucient to cover the broker's costs. In what follows, we describe the loan, borrower and risk
characteristics of non-QRM8 loans and contrast them to those for QRM8 loans. To the best of our
knowledge this oers a rst insight into the potential impact of QRM Rule 8. As an extension, we
consider Rule 8 in combination with other QRM rules, which are summarized in Table 10.24
[Table 10 about here]
7.2. The potential impact of QRM Rule 8 on loan performance and access to mortgage credit
Under rate schedule (12), borrowers constrained to non-QRM8 loans no longer have access to
low mortgage rates. In fact, if  r is set prohibitively high these borrowers may be barred from
access to mortgage credit altogether. For a wide range of broker cost specications, the top panel
of Table 11 reports descriptive statistics for both QRM8 and non-QRM8 loans. In the perfect
competition case (w=1), non-QRM8 loans account for 48% of the loans in our data. We nd that
non-QRM8 loans are generally taken out by borrowers with low FICO scores and a low monthly
income who purchase or renance homes in neighborhoods with a high percentage of minorities
and a low percentage of college graduates. The starkest contrast between non-QRM8 and QRM8
loans, however, is in the size of the loans. While QRM8 loans have an average size of 236K, non-
QRM8 loans are generally much smaller and have an average size of 140K. Given the small size of
non-QRM8 loans and our discussion in Section 4.1, it is not surprising that the average 12-month
delinquency rates are higher for non-QRM8 loans at 16% than for QRM8 loans at 11%.
24Only a few empirical studies have analyzed the potential impact of the proposed QRM rules, and none of them
has focused on QRM Rule 8. The Agencies (2011) investigate QRM Rules 2, 4 and 7, whereas the U.S. Government
Accountability Oce (GAO (2011)) analyzes QRM Rules 1, 3 and 7.
29[Table 11 about here]
Table 11 reports similar descriptive statistics for alternative cost specications. As cost esti-
mates shift from the perfect competition case (w = 1) to the perfect rent extraction case (w = 0),
fewer and fewer loans fall into the non-QRM8 category. At the same time, the gap in loan amount,
FICO scores, borrower income, neighborhood characteristics and delinquency rates between QRM8
and non-QRM8 loans widens. For w = 0, less than 3% of the loans are identied as non-QRM8
loans. The average size of non-QRM8 loans is very small at 58K, compared to 193K for QRM8
loans. Average 12-month delinquency rates are 25% for non-QRM8 loans and 13% for QRM8 loans.
Since smaller loans tend to have higher percentage costs than larger loans (Table 8), smaller
loans are more likely to fall under the non-QRM8 category. For cost estimates c0:5, Table 12 shows
that 70% of the loans of 50K or less, 57% of the 50-75K loans and 37% of the 75-100K loans are
non-QRM8 loans. In comparison, only 17% of the 100-200K loans, 4% of the 200-300K loans and
less than 1% of the 300K+ loans fall under the non-QRM8 category.
[Table 12 about here]
As a result, the decrease in delinquency rates from the full sample to the subsample of QRM8
loans is more pronounced for smaller loans than for larger loans. Specically, average 12-month
delinquency rates decrease from 17.0% to 13.1% for loans of 50K or less, from 19.0% to 15.1%
for 50-75K loans and from 15.1% to 13.0% for 75-100K loans. In comparison, delinquency rates
decrease from 12.4% to 11.5% for 100-200K loans, from 11.4% to 11.1% for 200-300K loans, and
remain nearly unchanged for 300K+ loans. Overall, average 12-month delinquency rates decrease
from 13.3% for the full sample to 11.9% for the subsample of QRM8 loans.
7.3. The potential impact of QRM Rule 8 on broker compensation
While the stated goal of the proposed QRM denition is to identify low-credit-risk loans, limits
on origination charges have historically been imposed to ght predatory lending. Predatory lending
is broadly dened as imposing unfair or abusive loan terms on borrowers. QRM Rule 8 would
enforce signicantly tighter constraints on broker compensation than the existing guidelines (see
Appendix D for details).
Marginal broker prots are computed as the dierence between revenues and costs. Large prots
indicate that the broker overcharges the borrower relative to the broker's cost of intermediating
the loan. For the subsample of QRM8 loans, Table 13 reports summary statistics for broker prots
based on observed revenues and also based on revenues that are capped at 3% of the loan amount.
30For the perfect rent extraction case (w=0), average broker prots per loan are $719 lower when
percentage revenues are capped at 3%. The decrease in prots is more pronounced for small and
medium-sized loans than for large loans, mainly because the larger the loan the less likely it is that
percentage revenues exceed 3% (Table 3). As the assumption underlying the cost estimates shifts
from the perfect rent extraction case to the perfect competition case, the decrease in prots when
revenues are capped at 3% becomes smaller.
[Table 13 about here]
The results in Table 13 suggest that the proposed QRM Rule 8 may not be successful in reducing
the prot dierential between large and small loans in any signicant way. Even with QRM Rule 8
in place, brokers may benet from steering borrowers towards larger loans and may expand extra
eorts to attract borrowers who purchase or renance large homes. In Appendix E, we propose an
alternative specication of QRM Rule 8 that replaces the 3% limit on origination charges by one
that is concave in the loan amount, as shown in Figure 5. Our alternative proposal is motivated by
the observation that broker costs are a concave rather than a linear function of loan size (Table 8).
The results of our ex post analysis suggest that the alternative specication of QRM Rule 8 may be
more eective than the current one in protecting large borrowers from being overcharged, thereby
narrowing the prot dierential between large and small loans.
[Figure 5 about here]
7.4. Interaction of Rule 8 with other QRM rules
The bottom panel of Table 11 reports descriptive statistics for QRM Rules 1 through 7, when
applied to the loans in our sample.25 Each of the proposed rules has at least some success in
reducing delinquency rates. Rule 3 imposing restrictions on payment terms and Rule 7 imposing
ability to repay requirements are the most restrictive rules. They are also the most eective rules
in terms of reducing delinquency rates among QRM loans. Compared to Rule 8, however, no other
rule creates a similar discrepancy in loan amount, borrower income or neighborhood characteristics
between QRM and non-QRM loans.
Table 13 shows the average broker prots for QRM8 loans that satisfy one additional QRM
rule. For the perfect rent extraction case, the lowest average prots are obtained for QRM8 loans
that satisfy Rule 3|1.6K prot per loan if revenues are capped at 3%|and for QRM8 loans that
satisfy Rule 7 (1.7K). While these prots are low in comparison to the average prot of 2.4K for
25Rule 6 is excluded because we cannot verify whether appraisals conformed to accepted standards.
31QRM8 loans, the lower prots come at the expense of excluding a large fraction of loans. Similar
observations apply to the alternative specication of QRM Rule 8 discussed in Appendix E.
8. Conclusion
Based on a sample of more than 600,000 brokered New Century loans, we document that brokers
charge higher percentage fees for loans that turn out to be riskier ex post. Conditional on variables
observed by the lender and the econometrician, a marginal increase in percentage fees by 1% is
associated with 7.6% higher odds of delinquency. We interpret our ndings through the lens of
a simple bargaining model in which the broker learns the borrower's information and has all the
bargaining power. Brokers can set fees without a feedback eect on other terms of the loan,
and borrowers shop from one or more brokers according to a second-price auction process. The
model implies that brokers extract high conditional fees from borrowers who shop from few brokers,
including borrowers with a high conditional valuation for the loan that shop from only one broker,
and from borrowers who shop from multiple brokers but for whom brokers perceive conditional
costs to be high. Our ndings suggest that unobserved borrower attributes such as suboptimal
shopping behavior, high valuation for the loan or high borrower-specic broker costs are associated
with high mortgage credit risk.
We present evidence that borrowers who pay higher conditional fees are inherently more risky,
and not simply because paying a higher fee leaves them more cash constrained. We argue that
the association between conditional fees and delinquency risk is stronger in cases where the lender
knows less about the borrower. We support our argument by documenting a stronger association
between conditional fees and delinquency risk when lenders have fewer incentives to carefully screen
borrowers, for purchase rather than renance loans, and for loans originated by brokers who have
less frequent interactions with the lender.
We explore whether lenders and regulators can use broker-revenue-based rate schedules to ex-
ploit the link between broker charges and delinquency risk. We consider a revenue-based rate
schedule where mortgage rates increase if percentage revenues exceed a certain threshold. If the
threshold is a constant, the schedule can only re
ect the unconditional link between percentage rev-
enues and delinquency risk. If, however, the revenue threshold varies with conditioning information,
the schedule can re
ect the conditional link between revenues and delinquency risk.
The Dodd-Frank Act imposes credit risk retention requirements for residential mortgage secu-
ritizations. Rule 8 of the proposed QRM guidelines for loans to be exempt from risk retention is
32likely to result in a revenue-based rate schedule for brokered loans with a revenue threshold of 3%.
We observe that given such a schedule, borrowers would have to pay higher rates whenever the
broker's percentage costs exceed 3%. We show that independent of the assumptions underlying
our cost estimates, percentage costs tend to be higher for smaller loans. Hence the proposed QRM
Rule 8 is likely to result in higher mortgage rates for smaller|and unconditionally riskier|loans.
It is unlikely, however, to impose any constraints on mortgage rates for larger loans.
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36A. Data Description and Sample Construction
The raw New Century data contains 3.2 million loans. We keep all wholesale loan applications
between 1997 and 2006 that were either funded, declined or withdrawn. We require records to
contain the broker id, the property zip code, a loan amount between 10K and 1,000K, a combined
loan-to-value ratio between 0 and 150, a FICO score between 300 and 850, a debt-to-income ratio
between 0 and 100, and a mortgage rate between 0 and 25%. This leaves us with roughly 1.5 million
brokered loans which are used to compute broker variables. We then restrict the sample to include
only funded loans, which yields roughly 768,000 observations.
To identify piggyback loans we search for a matching rst lien for any second lien loan. We
match on the funding date, the borrower's age and FICO score, the appraisal value, the loan
purpose, the occupancy status, and the property city and zip code. We obtain a match for the vast
majority of second liens. Second lien loans that cannot be matched are dropped, so that data is
composed of free-standing rst liens and piggyback loans. We do not observe whether a borrower
with a free-standing rst lien took out a second lien with another lender. While New Century did
not typically originate free-standing second liens, this may or may not be true for other lenders and
the fraction of piggybacks in our data should be viewed as a lower bound. Each match of a rst
and second lien is treated as one loan record. Broker fees and YSP are aggregated over the rst
and second lien. For all other characteristics, piggybacks are categorized based on the properties
of the rst lien. We require loan records to have data on all observable characteristics used in our
empirical analysis. We trim the sample by excluding loans with broker revenues in excess of 17.5K,
which account for less than 1% of the data. Our nal sample includes 668,582 funded broker loans.
The number of loans in our sample grew exponentially, from about 3,000 loans originated in
1997 to 143,000 in 2006. Piggyback loans became popular from 2004 onwards. The average size of
loans grew from about 100K in 1997 to more than 200K in 2006, with higher average amounts for
piggybacks. The number of brokers used by New Century in any given year grew dramatically, from
about 900 in 1997 to 26,000 in 2006. Over the sample period, about 669,000 loans were originated
by 56,000 independent brokers with an average size of 190K.
Our sample represents subprime loans from all parts of the country, with California, Florida
and Texas being the three biggest markets. About 90% of all loans were originated in metropolitan
areas. Approximately two-thirds of the loans were taken out to renance existing loans, and the
majority of the renance mortgages involved cash-out payments to the borrower. For the whole
sample period, hybrid loans were the most common ones followed by xed-rate loans. In the last
two years, loans with balloon and interest-only payments became more popular, reaching 54% of
37the loans in 2006. For most of the sample period, the 2/28 hybrid dominated the hybrid category
and the 30-year xed-rate loan the xed-rate category. The majority of loans came with a product-
specic prepayment penalty. The fraction of limited and stated documentation loans varied between
33% in 1997 and 47% in 2004.
The majority of the loans were for single-family homes that served as the borrower's primary
residence. The average borrower FICO score fell by almost 30 points between 1997 and 2001, before
rising again by roughly the same amount during the second half of the sample. Piggyback loans
were made to borrowers with relatively high credit scores, but presumably no cash savings. The
borrowers who took out low documentation loans usually had higher credit scores than those that
provided full documentation. Even though the average combined monthly income rose from 5.4K
in 1997 to 7.2K in 2006, debt-to-income ratios increased slightly, from 37% in 1997 to 41% in 2006.
Loan amounts grew not only relative to income levels, but also relative to property values. LTV
ratios rose from 73% in 1997 to 80% later in the sample, as second liens gained in popularity.
From 1999 onwards, the data contain detailed servicing records for most loans. We consider
a loan to be delinquent if payments are 60 days or more late, or if the loan is in foreclosure, real
estate owned or in default. For each year of origination k, let b pk
s denote the number of vintage-k
loans experiencing a rst-time delinquency s months after origination, divided by the number of
vintage-k loans that are still active after s months or experience a rst-time delinquency at age s.
The cumulative delinquency rate of vintage-k loans at age t is
b Pk




1   b pk
s

; for k = 1999;:::;2006:
Figure 1 plots b Pk
t as a function of the age of the loan t and vintage k. The results in Table 5
show that after controlling for year-by-year variation in loan-level characteristics, loans originated
in 2004 and 2005 were riskier than loans originated earlier in the sample.
B. Performance-based Funding Decisions and Prot Sharing
We describe two alternative approaches to protecting lenders from unobserved borrower risk. First,
lenders may incentivize brokers to reveal otherwise unobserved borrower risk by tracking past broker
performance, and by identifying brokers who originated loans with abnormally high delinquency
rates in the past as underperforming brokers. Lenders may screen loan applications submitted
by underperforming brokers more thoroughly, oer the best rates only to brokers with a good
38performance record, or reject applications submitted by underperforming brokers more frequently.
Lenders may also exercise more caution in interacting with new brokers for whom performance
statistics are not yet available.
Second, brokers may receive only a portion of their fees at closing. The remaining fees are placed
in a trust for a certain number of months or until the loan becomes delinquent, whichever occurs
rst. If the loan remains active throughout the waiting period, the accrued value of the remaining
fees is paid to the broker, otherwise that amount goes to the lender. If the fee received at closing
represents a benchmark conditional broker fee, our proposed strategy exploits the unobserved het-
erogeneity in fees to reduce the lender's risk exposure, without imposing additional constraints on
access to mortgage credit. For loans that are sold and securitized, it is in the interest of secondary
market investors to incentivize lenders to disclose broker charges and to pass along any payouts from
high conditional fees in the event of an early delinquency. Recent work on securitization and mort-
gage default include Downing, Jaee, and Wallace (2009), Mian and Su (2009), Keys, Mukherjee,
Seru, and Vig (2010), Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012), Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2010), Bubb and
Kaufman (2011), Bubb and Kaufman (2009), Elul (2011), Hartman-Glaser, Piskorski, and Tchistyi
(2011), and Malamud, Rui, and Whinston (2011).
C. Additional Details on the QRM Proposal
The QRM term is to be dened jointly by six regulatory agencies. The \Agencies" include the Of-
ce of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. In March 2011, the Agencies published
a proposal of QRM guidelines for public comment. Such comments have since been submitted
by the National Association of Mortgage Brokers (NABM, www.namb.org), the National Asso-
ciation of Realtors (NAR, www.realtor.org) and the private mortgage insurance industry (MCIA,
www.micanews.com), among many others. Dodd-Frank provides that the risk retention rule for res-
idential mortgage-backed securities will become eective one year after publication of the nalized
QRM rule, which has not yet been issued.
The stated objective of the QRM proposal is to ensure that QRM loans have \low credit risk even
in stressful economic environments" (Agencies (2011)). The proposed QRM rules are summarized
in Table 8. Rules 1 through 7 restrict QRM eligibility to rst lien loans on a one-to-four family
residential property to be purchased or renanced as a principal residence. The maturity of the
39loan cannot exceed 30 years, and the borrower must have a clean credit history. The maximum
permitted loan-to-value ratio is 80% in a purchase transaction, 75% in a renance transaction, and
70% in a cash-out renance situation. The borrower's debt-to-income ratio cannot exceed 36%, and
income and nancial resources must be veried and documented. Prepayment penalties are not
permitted and the loan cannot have payment terms that allow for balloon payments, interest-only
payments or negative amortization.
QRM Rule 8 restricts the origination charges payable by the borrower in connection with the
mortgage transaction to 3% of the loan amount. \Origination charges" are dened in the Federal
Reserve Board's Regulation Z (12 CFR section 226.4) and include (i) all compensation paid directly
or indirectly by the borrower or lender to the mortgage originator, (ii) nance charges (sections
226.4(a) and 226.4(b)) such as appraisal and credit report fees, but excluding interest and time price
dierentials, (iii) real-estate related fees (section 226.4(c)(7)) such as title insurance and notary
fees, unless reasonable, (iv) credit insurance premia and debt cancellation or suspension fees, and
(v) prepayment penalties incurred by the borrower for a previous loan held by the same lender.
For the loans in our sample, the observed broker revenues are a tight lower bound for origination
charges. The revenues consist of all compensation paid directly or indirectly by the borrower to the
broker, and include nance charges such as appraisal and credit report fees. Our data suggest that
additional fees such as credit insurance premia, debt cancellation or suspension fees, or prepayment
penalties for previous loans account for only a small portion of the borrower's origination charges.
D. Existing Predatory Lending Guidelines
Predatory lending is broadly dened as imposing unfair or abusive loan terms on borrowers (see
www.fdicoig.gov/reports06/06-011.pdf). Although predatory lending occurs across all demograph-
ics, subprime borrowers have been the more likely targets (see Bond, Musto, and Yilmaz (2009)
and Freddie Mac (2012)). HOEPA Section 32 attempts to counteract predatory lending by enforc-
ing strict disclosure requirements and by imposing restrictions on product features for loans with
high rates or high origination charges. For a summary of HOEPA, state and agency high cost loan
policies, see www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/homes/rea19.shtm. Fannie Mae's and Fred-
die Mac's anti-predatory lending requirements are available online at www.efanniemae.com and
www.freddiemac.com. Government-sponsored agencies do not buy Section 32 mortgages, which
provides additional incentives for lenders to avoid such loans. Less than 0.2% of the loans in our
data are Section 32 mortgages.
40The limit on origination charges for Section 32 mortgages is generally much larger than that
proposed by QRM Rule 8. HOEPA Section 32 denes high-fee loans as loans for which total
origination charges exceed the larger of $592 or 8% of the loan amount (see Footnote 3). As a result,
the proposed QRM Rule 8 would impose signicantly tighter restrictions on broker compensation
than the existing HOEPA guidelines.
E. An Alternative Specication of QRM Rule 8
Consider an alternative specication of the proposed QRM Rule 8 that restricts origination charges
to 3% for loans of size 200K or less and to 10K for loans of more than 500K. In between, maximum
dollar charges grow according to a piecewise linear schedule that caps origination charges at 8K
and 9K for loans 300K and 400K loans, respectively. (To propose the alternative specication, we
computed average broker costs c1 for loans of size 100K, 200K, :::, 1,000K and used these estimates
to derive a piecewise linear threshold for origination charges.) Figure 5 contrasts the alternative
rule with QRM Rule 8, and highlights that the alternative specication imposes tighter restrictions
on origination charges for loans in excess of 200K.
The middle panel of Table 12 shows that the tighter constraints on origination charges exclude
only few additional loans, except for the most conservative cost estimates. QRM8alt loans are
loans for which costs do not exceed the limit on broker revenues imposed by the alternative QRM
Rule 8. The fraction of QRM8alt loans in our sample is 97.5%, 92.3%, 78.4%, 60.1% and 46.2%
for cost estimates c0, c0:25, c0:5, c0:75 and c1. This compares to 97.5%, 92.3%, 79.8%, 64.8% and
51.9% for QRM Rule 8. Average 12-month delinquency rates are no higher under the alternative
specication than under QRM Rule 8. If anything, for large loans and cost estimates c0:5, c0:75 and
c1, delinquency rates are lower under the alternative rule than under the original rule.
Broker prots for medium-sized and especially for large loans are substantially smaller under
the alternative specication of QRM Rule 8 than under the original one. For the perfect rent
extraction case (w=0), Table 13 reports average broker prots of 1.8K, 3.0K, 4.1K and 5.7K for
100-200K, 200-300K, 300-500K and 500K+ QRM8alt loans when the alternative specication of
limits on origination charges is applied, compared to average prots of 1.8K, 3.2K, 4.9K and 7.2K
for QRM8 loans when the 3% cap on origination charges is applied. Overall, our results suggest
that a limit on origination charges that is concave in the loan amount may be more eective in
narrowing the prot dierential between large and small loans than a linear one.
41Table 1: List of Variables
Variable Description
Loan Characteristics
Rate Initial mortgage rate in %
NC points Upfront charges by New Century in %
Rate margin for hybrids Rate margin that is added to an index to determine a 
oating rate, in %
Loan amount Loan amount in thousands of dollars
2/28 (3/27) Indicators for 2/28 (3/27) loans. A 2/28 loan is a 30-year loan for which the mortgage
rate is xed for the rst two years, after which the rate begins to 
oat based on an index
plus a margin. For a 3/27 loan, the rate is xed for the rst 3 years.
Hybrid Indicator for 2/28 or 3/27 loans
FRM Indicator for 15-, 20- or 30-year xed-rate loans
Balloon/IO Indicator for mortgages with a balloon or interest-only payments
Piggyback Indicator for a matched pair of a rst and a second lien loan
Low documentation Indicator for a limited or a stated documentation loan
Prepay penalty Indicator for a loan with a prepayment penalty
Re, cash out Indicator for a cash-out renancing
Re, no cash out Indicator for a no-cash-out renancing
LTV Loan-to-value ratio, i.e. the value of the loan divided by that of the house, in %
CLTV Combined loan-to-value ratio, i.e. the value of all liens on the house divided by the
value of the house, in %
Property Characteristics
2nd home/investment prop Indicator for second home or investment property, equals 1 minus \Primary residence"
dummy
Multi unit Indicator for 2-4 unit properties, equals 1 minus \Single unit" dummy
Borrower Characteristics
FICO Fair, Isaac and Company (FICO) credit score at origination
Debt-to-income All monthly debt payments divided by monthly gross income in %, also referred to as
back-end ratio
Risk grade Risk category assigned to the loan by the lender based on the borrower's credit history,
FICO score, LTV and debt-to-income ratio
Monthly income Combined monthly borrower income in thousands of dollars
Broker Variables
Broker competition For a given month and zip code, broker competition is the number of brokers who
submitted loan applications to New Century divided by the number of housing units
(in thousands)
Active broker Indicator for brokers with ve or more loan applications submitted to New Century
in previous month
Neighborhood Characteristics
Race % white population in zip code, based on 2000 census data
Education % of population with a BA degree in zip code, based on 2000 census data
Regulation Variables
Regulation (coverage) Index of coverage of anti-predatory lending laws
Regulation (brokers, Pahl) Pahl (2007) index of mortgage broker regulation
Market Conditions
6mo LIBOR 6-month LIBOR rate in %
30yr x rate - 6mo LIBOR Spread between 30-year conventional mortgage rate and 6-month LIBOR in %
House prices Lagged abnormal 3-year cumulative house price appreciation in % (Source: OFHEO)
Location
Non-metro area Indicator for non-metropolitan area, based on Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA)
codes
42Table 2: Descriptive Statistics The table reports descriptive statistics for brokered loans funded by New Century.
Our data include 668,582 loans originated between 1997 and 2006. Details on the sample construction are provided
in Appendix A.
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All
Broker loans funded by New Century (1,000)
No of rst liens 3 12 16 14 26 59 107 137 151 143 669
free-standing 3 12 16 14 26 58 102 113 108 104 557
piggyback 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 24 43 39 112
Loan amt of rst liens 102 101 113 127 149 158 173 194 214 217 190
free-standing 102 101 113 127 149 157 172 192 208 209 183
piggyback (total) 0 126 0 175 199 206 232 258 288 296 281
No of brokers 1 3 4 4 5 9 15 21 25 26 56
Location (percent)
CA 28 18 19 27 33 30 30 30 27 21 27
FL 5 8 9 10 8 9 9 9 12 12 10
TX 4 4 7 7 4 5 6 6 5 8 6
West w/o CA 22 15 13 13 12 11 10 14 14 12 13
South w/o FL, TX 4 14 15 13 12 12 11 11 11 14 12
Midwest 35 32 26 23 25 23 19 16 15 17 18
Northeast 3 8 12 7 7 10 14 15 16 17 14
Metro areas 90 90 89 90 91 91 92 91 91 90 91
Loan characteristics (percent)
Re, cash out 54 48 55 57 60 62 63 56 47 47 54
Re, no cash out 22 16 16 16 17 17 11 6 9 9 10
2/28 61 57 62 66 78 70 65 57 41 28 51
3/27 6 4 7 17 3 3 3 3 7 4 5
30yr FRM 29 34 26 15 16 23 28 20 17 13 19
20yr FRM 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
15yr FRM 4 4 4 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 2
Ballon w/ adj rate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 36 9
Ballon w/ xed rate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1
Interest only 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 27 14 12
Prepay penalty 68 72 76 85 84 81 81 79 74 72 77
Low doc 33 38 37 38 44 44 41 47 44 41 43
Rate 30yr FRM 9.7 10.1 10.3 11.2 9.7 8.4 7.5 7.1 7.3 8.5 7.9
Rate 2/28 9.9 9.8 10.0 10.7 9.6 8.5 7.6 7.3 7.7 8.9 8.1
Margin 2/28 7.0 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.6 6.6 5.8 5.6 5.8 6.2 6.0
Property characteristics (percent)
Primary residence 81 78 85 90 90 91 93 92 89 87 90
Single unit 92 91 92 93 93 92 93 92 93 93 93
Borrower characteristics (percent)
FICO 612 612 605 587 585 594 605 620 622 614 612
piggyback { 707 { 646 666 651 647 658 655 653 654
low doc 620 620 613 597 597 606 613 633 641 634 627
LTV 73 77 77 76 78 78 80 80 80 80 80
CLTV 74 79 79 78 79 80 82 85 86 86 84
Monthly income 5.4 5.5 5.3 5.6 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.8 7.2 6.4
Debt-to-income ratio 37 36 37 39 39 39 39 40 40 41 40
43Table 3: Broker Charges The table reports average per-loan broker fees, YSP and revenues. The top panel shows
the statistics by origination year, whereas the bottom panel shows the statistics for loans sorted on loan amount and
on origination period (1997-03, 2004-06), loan program (hybrid, xed-rate, balloon/IO), level of documentation (full,
low), FICO score (< 620,  620), and prepayment penalty (no PP, PP). Our data include 668,582 loans originated
between 1997 and 2006.
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All
Percent of loan amount
Fees 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.3
YSP 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.9
Revenue 4.9 4.4 4.4 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.1
Dollar per loan (1,000)
Fees 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.9 4.2 3.7
YSP 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.6
Revenue 4.2 3.7 4.1 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.3
All '97-03 '04-06 Hybr FRM B/IO Full Low <620 620 nPP PP
Dollar per loan ($1,000)
Loan amount  50K
Fees 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.8
YSP 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Revenue 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.3
Loan amount 2 (50,75]K
Fees 2.1 2.3 1.9 2.1 2.1 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.2
YSP 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Revenue 2.8 3.0 2.6 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.9
Loan amount 2 (75,100]K
Fees 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.6
YSP 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9
Revenue 3.4 3.6 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.5
Loan amount 2 (100,200]K
Fees 3.3 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.1 2.8 3.5
YSP 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3
Revenue 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.8 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.4 4.2 4.8
Loan amount 2 (200,300]K
Fees 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.6 5.0 4.4 4.1 4.9
YSP 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.3 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.9
Revenue 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.8 6.2 6.6 6.7 6.6 7.0 6.4 6.2 6.8
Loan amount 2 (300,500]K
Fees 5.8 5.3 5.9 5.3 5.8 6.2 5.9 5.7 6.1 5.6 5.2 6.0
YSP 2.7 2.9 2.6 3.4 1.9 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 2.6
Revenue 8.5 8.2 8.6 8.7 7.7 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.9 8.3 8.2 8.6
Loan amount > 500K
Fees 6.5 6.0 6.5 5.7 6.6 6.7 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.4 5.4 6.8
YSP 3.3 3.3 3.3 4.2 2.4 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.8 3.0
Revenue 9.7 9.3 9.7 9.9 9.0 9.8 9.7 9.7 9.8 9.7 9.2 9.9
44Table 4: Explaining Rates, Broker Revenues and Fees The rst two columns report the parameter estimates
from regressing mortgage rates on percentage fees, percentage YSP and observable loan, property, borrower and
broker characteristics, neighborhood and regulation variables, market conditions, and year and location dummies.
Columns three though six show the parameter estimates from regressing broker revenues, in dollars per loan (columns
three and four) and as a percentage of the loan amount (columns ve and six), on observable characteristics. Similar
results are reported for broker fees in columns seven through ten. The benchmark set of loans includes all full
documentation no-prepay-penalty 2/28 loans between 100 and 200K taken out by a borrower with a risk grade of
AA or better and a FICO score between 600 and 620 to purchase a single-unit primary residence in CA in 2006. Our
data include 668,582 loans originated between 1997 and 2006.
Rates (%) Rev ($1,000) Rev (%) Fees ($1,000) Fees (%)
Fees (%) 0.006 (0.001)
YSP ($1,000) -0.338 (0.002)
YSP (%) 0.524 (0.001) -0.274 (0.002)
Loan amt  50K 0.573 (0.004) -1.880 (0.088) 1.450 (0.009) -1.236 (0.081) 1.521 (0.009)
Loan amt 2 (50;75]K 0.412 (0.003) -1.346 (0.074) 0.806 (0.006) -0.895 (0.068) 0.894 (0.005)
Loan amt 2 (75;100]K 0.149 (0.002) -0.487 (0.092) 0.447 (0.005) -0.251 (0.085) 0.481 (0.005)
Loan amt 2 (200;300]K -0.199 (0.002) 0.602 (0.055) -0.298 (0.004) 0.447 (0.051) -0.370 (0.004)
Loan amt 2 (300;500]K -0.300 (0.002) 3.684 (0.052) -0.536 (0.005) 2.774 (0.048) -0.649 (0.005)
Loan amt > 500K -0.203 (0.005) 6.570 (0.141) -0.934 (0.011) 5.382 (0.130) -0.970 (0.010)
Loan amt 0.023 (0.000) 0.016 (0.000)
if  50K 0.025 (0.002) 0.017 (0.002)
if 2 (50;75]K 0.015 (0.001) 0.011 (0.001)
if 2 (75;100]K 0.004 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)
if 2 (200;300]K -0.003 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000)
if 2 (300;500]K -0.013 (0.000) -0.009 (0.000)
if > 500K -0.019 (0.000) -0.015 (0.000)
Constant 3.976 (0.022) -0.174 (0.088) 2.084 (0.046) 2.077 (0.082) 2.983 (0.043)
R2 0.845 0.507 0.419 0.405 0.378
Additional conditioning variables included but not reported
Loan and Property Characteristics: Rate - 6mo LIBOR, NC points, Rate margin for hybrids; Dummies for product types
3/27, 30yr FRM, 20yr FRM, 15yr FRM, Balloon w/ adj rate, Balloon w/ xed rate and Interest only; Dummies for
Prepay penalty, Low documentation, Piggyback; Dummies for Re with cash out and Re with no cash out; Dummies
for LTV  0:65, LTV 2 (0:65;0:70], (0:70;0:75], (0:80;0:85], (0:85;0:90], (0:90;0:95] and (0:95;1]; 2nd home/investment
property, Multi units
Borrower Characteristics: Dummies for FICO 2 [500;525), [525;550), [550;575), [575;600), [620;640), [640;660),
[660;680), [680;700),  700; Debt-to-income ratio; Dummies for risk grades A+, A-, B and C
Broker Variables: Broker competition, Active broker
Neighborhood and Regulation Variables: Race, Education, Regulation (coverage), Regulation (broker, Pahl)
Market Conditions: 6mo LIBOR, 30yr x rate - 6mo LIBOR, House prices
Year and Location Dummies: Dummies for origination years 1997 through 2005; Dummies for FL, TX, West w/o CA,
South w/o FL or TX, MidWest and NorthEast; Non-metro area
45Table 5: Broker Charges and Delinquency Risk The table reports the parameter estimates for the proportional
odds duration model in (8), with nonsurvival dened as 60-day delinquency or worse. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses. The benchmark set of loans includes all full documentation no-prepay-penalty 2/28 loans between 100
and 200K taken out by a borrower with a risk grade of AA or better and a FICO score between 600 and 620 to
purchase a single-unit primary residence in CA in 2006. Our data include 615,384 loans originated between 1999 and
2006.
Est Std err Est Std err Est Std err
Broker Charges
Revenue/loan amt (%) 0.062 (0.005)
Fees/loan amt (%) 0.073 (0.005)
YSP/loan amt (%) -0.002 (0.011)
Loan and Property Characteristics
Rate-6mo LIBOR 0.325 (0.009) 0.299 (0.009) 0.336 (0.011)
NC points 0.019 (0.014) 0.025 (0.014) 0.033 (0.014)
Rate margin for hybrids -0.080 (0.019) -0.078 (0.019) -0.083 (0.019)
Loan amt  50K -0.001 (0.038) -0.089 (0.039) -0.115 (0.039)
Loan amt 2 (50K;75K] 0.073 (0.022) 0.026 (0.023) 0.009 (0.023)
Loan amt 2 (75K;100K] 0.020 (0.021) -0.007 (0.021) -0.014 (0.021)
Loan amt 2 (200K;300K] 0.149 (0.020) 0.166 (0.020) 0.175 (0.020)
Loan amt 2 (300K;500K] 0.399 (0.023) 0.428 (0.024) 0.444 (0.024)
Loan amt > 500K 0.741 (0.046) 0.794 (0.046) 0.806 (0.046)
3/27 0.039 (0.026) 0.046 (0.026) 0.042 (0.026)
30yr FRM -0.805 (0.113) -0.765 (0.114) -0.835 (0.114)
20yr FRM -0.990 (0.149) -0.961 (0.149) -1.036 (0.149)
15yr FRM -1.093 (0.133) -1.059 (0.133) -1.129 (0.133)
Balloon w/ adjustable rate 0.075 (0.026) 0.077 (0.026) 0.061 (0.026)
Balloon w/ xed rate -0.481 (0.131) -0.446 (0.131) -0.522 (0.132)
Interest only -0.131 (0.024) -0.119 (0.024) -0.132 (0.024)
Prepay penalty 0.136 (0.017) 0.110 (0.017) 0.119 (0.017)
Low documentation 0.326 (0.016) 0.353 (0.016) 0.316 (0.017)
Piggyback 0.627 (0.027) 0.650 (0.028) 0.644 (0.028)
Re w/ cash out -0.401 (0.016) -0.425 (0.017) -0.435 (0.017)
Re w/o cash out -0.245 (0.023) -0.255 (0.023) -0.261 (0.023)
LTV  0:65 -0.397 (0.031) -0.424 (0.031) -0.405 (0.031)
LTV 2 (0:65;0:70] -0.192 (0.032) -0.212 (0.032) -0.201 (0.032)
LTV 2 (0:70;0:75] -0.111 (0.026) -0.122 (0.026) -0.117 (0.026)
LTV 2 (0:80;0:85] 0.111 (0.021) 0.122 (0.021) 0.109 (0.021)
LTV 2 (0:85;0:90] 0.183 (0.023) 0.207 (0.023) 0.182 (0.023)
LTV 2 (0:90;0:95] 0.067 (0.037) 0.100 (0.037) 0.060 (0.038)
LTV 2 (0:95;1] 0.204 (0.064) 0.252 (0.064) 0.180 (0.065)
2nd home/investment prop 0.010 (0.023) 0.022 (0.023) -0.008 (0.024)
Multi units 0.009 (0.027) 0.010 (0.027) 0.007 (0.027)
Borrower Characteristics
FICO 2 [500;525) 0.719 (0.030) 0.740 (0.030) 0.692 (0.031)
FICO 2 [525;550) 0.611 (0.028) 0.626 (0.028) 0.593 (0.029)
FICO 2 [550;575) 0.432 (0.027) 0.439 (0.027) 0.419 (0.027)
FICO 2 [575;600) 0.239 (0.025) 0.243 (0.025) 0.231 (0.025)
FICO 2 [620;640) -0.175 (0.027) -0.177 (0.027) -0.172 (0.027)
Continued on next page
46Table 5 { continued from previous page
Est Std err Est Std err Est Std err
FICO 2 [640;660) -0.400 (0.030) -0.404 (0.030) -0.394 (0.030)
FICO 2 [660;680) -0.618 (0.035) -0.623 (0.035) -0.610 (0.035)
FICO 2 [680;700) -0.815 (0.044) -0.823 (0.044) -0.804 (0.044)
FICO  700 -0.997 (0.041) -1.005 (0.041) -0.988 (0.041)
Debt-to-income ratio 0.006 (0.001) 0.006 (0.001) 0.006 (0.001)
Risk grade A+ 0.176 (0.021) 0.187 (0.021) 0.174 (0.021)
Risk grade A- 0.215 (0.025) 0.228 (0.025) 0.209 (0.025)
Risk grade B 0.506 (0.028) 0.523 (0.028) 0.493 (0.029)
Risk grade C 0.728 (0.035) 0.762 (0.035) 0.703 (0.036)
Broker Variables
Broker competition 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Active broker 0.033 (0.014) 0.014 (0.014) 0.012 (0.014)
Neighborhood and Regulation Variables
Race -0.003 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000)
Education -0.009 (0.001) -0.008 (0.001) -0.007 (0.001)
Regulation (coverage) -0.005 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003)
Regulation (brokers, Pahl) -0.012 (0.003) -0.011 (0.003) -0.011 (0.003)
Market Conditions
6mo LIBOR 0.345 (0.027) 0.331 (0.027) 0.360 (0.027)
30yr x mortg rate-6mo LIBOR 0.029 (0.028) 0.033 (0.028) 0.036 (0.028)
House prices -0.011 (0.002) -0.012 (0.002) -0.012 (0.002)
Year and Location Dummies
1999 -0.939 (0.045) -0.971 (0.046) -0.993 (0.046)
2000 -1.102 (0.059) -1.127 (0.059) -1.162 (0.059)
2001 -0.515 (0.047) -0.517 (0.047) -0.550 (0.048)
2002 -0.524 (0.065) -0.533 (0.064) -0.544 (0.065)
2003 -0.452 (0.063) -0.462 (0.063) -0.455 (0.063)
2004 -0.250 (0.052) -0.270 (0.052) -0.244 (0.052)
2005 -0.032 (0.031) -0.054 (0.031) -0.027 (0.031)
FL -0.064 (0.035) -0.068 (0.035) -0.060 (0.035)
TX 0.076 (0.039) 0.069 (0.039) 0.088 (0.039)
West w/o CA 0.119 (0.030) 0.127 (0.030) 0.137 (0.030)
South w/o FL or TX 0.288 (0.029) 0.279 (0.029) 0.283 (0.029)
MidWest 0.303 (0.028) 0.293 (0.029) 0.299 (0.029)
NorthEast 0.217 (0.026) 0.205 (0.027) 0.212 (0.027)
Non-metro area -0.002 (0.022) -0.005 (0.022) -0.006 (0.022)
47Table 6: Robustness Checks The top panel of the table shows average 12-month delinquency rates for a number
of homogeneous loan pools. Each loan pool consists of 2/28 loans between 100 and 300K with a prepayment penalty
and originated in 2004 or 2005. The loans in a given pool have the same documentation level (full versus low), are
of similar credit quality (low versus high FICO), and have the same loan purpose (purchase versus renance). For
full documentation loans, low (high) FICO loans are those with a FICO score of less (no less) than 600. For low
documentation loans, low (high) FICO loans are those with a FICO score of less (no less) than 620. Each of the
resulting eight loan pools is divided into three equally sized subpools based on the spread between the initial mortgage
rate and 6-month LIBOR (low versus medium versus high rates). Each of the resulting 24 loan pools is divided into
three equally sized subpools based on the percentage broker fee (low versus medium versus high %Fee). The bottom
panel shows the parameter estimates for the proportional odds duration model in (8) with Xcomp = (%Fees;%YSP)
and Xcond as in Table 5, for dierent strata of the data. The rst and second rows show the coecient estimate for
percentage fees and its standard error. The third row shows the increase in the log proportional odds ratio associated
with a one standard deviation increase in percentage broker fees. Our data include 615,384 loans originated between
1999 and 2006.
12-month delinquency rates (percent) for homogeneous loan pools
Full documentation Low documentation
Low rates Med rates High rates Low rates Med rates High rates
Low FICO, Purchase
Low %Fees 18.2 19.9 23.4 5.8 6.4 13.4
High %Fees 22.3 29.9 36.2 7.2 10.5 9.4
Low FICO, Renance
Low %Fees 7.8 15.4 21.2 3.0 4.8 7.4
High %Fees 12.3 19.8 23.5 6.1 3.6 9.0
High FICO, Purchase
Low %Fees 19.3 21.7 34.8 4.4 4.9 12.1
High %Fees 22.6 20.7 36.5 6.7 11.9 20.1
High FICO, Renance
Low %Fees 10.9 17.5 20.2 3.9 4.3 8.9
High %Fees 11.4 19.9 26.1 3.2 10.6 14.7
Loan performance results for stratied data
Full documentation Low documentation
Low FICO High FICO Low FICO High FICO
0.042 0.108 0.048 0.168
(0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014)
0.058 0.138 0.065 0.194
Loan type 2/28 30yr FRM 2/28 30yr FRM 2/28 30yr FRM 2/28 30yr FRM
0.040 0.034 0.087 0.125 0.046 0.081 0.176 0.131
(0.010) (0.021) (0.020) (0.035) (0.012) (0.030) (0.019) (0.045)
0.059 0.047 0.122 0.152 0.069 0.112 0.264 0.172
Loan purpose Purchase Re Purchase Re Purchase Re Purchase Re
0.081 0.022 0.180 0.046 0.086 0.027 0.209 0.091
(0.015) (0.010) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.022)
0.106 0.024 0.228 0.045 0.124 0.038 0.296 0.120
Broker Low High Low High Low High Low High
competition 0.037 0.048 0.099 0.112 0.060 0.026 0.145 0.196
(0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021)
0.057 0.069 0.148 0.144 0.079 0.031 0.184 0.211
Broker Inactive Active Inactive Active Inactive Active Inactive Active
activity 0.051 0.023 0.136 0.055 0.055 0.031 0.165 0.171
(0.010) (0.015) (0.018) (0.027) (0.012) (0.019) (0.017) (0.027)
0.073 0.029 0.188 0.063 0.080 0.043 0.229 0.207
48Table 7: Marginal Eect of Broker Fees on Delinquency Risk The top three rows of the table report the
parameter estimates for the proportional odds duration model in (8) when Xcomp includes %YSP as well as %Fees
interacted with documentation level (full versus low) and FICO range (< 600, [600;620), [620;660) and  660) as
in (10) and Xcond is as in Table 5. For each combination of documentation level and FICO range, the rst and second
row show the coecient estimate for percentage fees and its standard error, respectively. The third row shows the
increase in the log proportional odds ratio associated with a one standard deviation increase in percentage broker
fees. Standard deviations are computed conditional on documentation level and FICO range. The next set of rows
reports similar results when percentage fees are interacted with documentation level, credit quality (low versus high
FICO) and loan purpose (purchase versus renance) as in (11). For full documentation loans, low (high) FICO loans
are those with a FICO score of less (no less) than 600. For low documentation loans, low (high) FICO loans are those
with a FICO score of less (no less) than 620. Standard deviations are computed conditional on documentation level,
credit quality and loan purpose. The last set of rows reports the results when percentage fees are interacted with
documentation level, credit quality and broker activity (active versus inactive). Standard deviations are computed
conditional on documentation level, credit quality and broker activity. Our data include 615,384 loans originated
between 1999 and 2006.
Full documentation Low documentation
FICO < 600 [600;620) [620;660)  660 < 600 [600;620) [620;660)  660
0.060 0.097 0.092 0.143 0.043 0.094 0.119 0.170
(0.007) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.009) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017)
0.084 0.124 0.117 0.183 0.059 0.121 0.142 0.190
Low FICO High FICO Low FICO High FICO
Loan purpose Purchase Re Purchase Re Purchase Re Purchase Re
0.116 0.044 0.139 0.058 0.081 0.035 0.146 0.110
(0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
0.152 0.048 0.176 0.057 0.117 0.049 0.207 0.145
Broker activity Inactive Active Inactive Active Inactive Active Inactive Active
0.072 0.047 0.106 0.061 0.056 0.044 0.142 0.102
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
0.103 0.060 0.146 0.071 0.081 0.061 0.197 0.124
49Table 8: Broker Costs and Prots The table reports average marginal broker costs and prots per loan, for
dierent cost specications c
w in Equation (13). The top panel conditions on the year of origination, whereas the
bottom panel conditions on the loan amount (in $1,000). Our data include 668,582 loans originated between 1997
and 2006.
w 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 0 0.25 0.5 0.75
By origination year
Costs ($1,000) Prots ($1,000)
1997 1.775 2.388 3.002 3.615 4.229 2.454 1.840 1.227 0.613
1998 1.453 2.023 2.592 3.161 3.730 2.277 1.708 1.139 0.569
1999 1.596 2.219 2.841 3.463 4.085 2.489 1.867 1.245 0.622
2000 1.841 2.518 3.194 3.870 4.546 2.705 2.029 1.352 0.676
2001 2.018 2.723 3.428 4.133 4.838 2.819 2.114 1.410 0.705
2002 2.197 2.898 3.599 4.299 5.000 2.804 2.103 1.402 0.701
2003 2.223 2.929 3.635 4.341 5.047 2.824 2.118 1.412 0.706
2004 2.295 3.071 3.847 4.624 5.400 3.105 2.329 1.553 0.776
2005 2.384 3.207 4.031 4.854 5.678 3.294 2.470 1.647 0.823
2006 2.330 3.169 4.007 4.845 5.684 3.353 2.515 1.677 0.838
All 2.248 3.017 3.787 4.556 5.326 3.078 2.308 1.539 0.769
Percentage costs Percentage prots
1997 2.013 2.737 3.461 4.186 4.910 2.897 2.172 1.448 0.724
1998 1.546 2.277 3.008 3.739 4.470 2.924 2.193 1.462 0.731
1999 1.591 2.289 2.987 3.685 4.383 2.792 2.094 1.396 0.698
2000 1.700 2.334 2.968 3.602 4.237 2.537 1.903 1.268 0.634
2001 1.584 2.140 2.695 3.251 3.806 2.223 1.667 1.111 0.556
2002 1.634 2.145 2.656 3.168 3.679 2.045 1.534 1.023 0.511
2003 1.484 1.937 2.390 2.843 3.296 1.812 1.359 0.906 0.453
2004 1.339 1.762 2.185 2.608 3.031 1.692 1.269 0.846 0.423
2005 1.270 1.668 2.066 2.463 2.861 1.591 1.193 0.795 0.398
2006 1.256 1.642 2.029 2.415 2.802 1.546 1.160 0.773 0.387
All 1.384 1.829 2.274 2.720 3.165 1.780 1.335 0.890 0.445
By loan amount ($1,000)
Costs ($1,000) Prots ($1,000)
 50 0.828 1.182 1.536 1.889 2.243 1.415 1.061 0.707 0.354
(50,75] 1.271 1.655 2.039 2.423 2.807 1.536 1.152 0.768 0.384
(75,100] 1.577 2.034 2.492 2.950 3.408 1.831 1.373 0.915 0.458
(100,200] 2.148 2.782 3.416 4.051 4.685 2.537 1.903 1.269 0.634
(200,300] 2.835 3.800 4.764 5.729 6.693 3.858 2.894 1.929 0.965
(300,500] 3.243 4.575 5.908 7.240 8.573 5.330 3.997 2.665 1.332
>500 2.528 4.338 6.148 7.958 9.768 7.240 5.430 3.620 1.810
Percentage costs Percentage prots
 50 1.968 2.849 3.731 4.612 5.493 3.525 2.644 1.762 0.881
(50,75] 2.006 2.615 3.225 3.834 4.443 2.437 1.827 1.218 0.609
(75,100] 1.753 2.263 2.773 3.283 3.794 2.041 1.531 1.020 0.510
(100,200] 1.449 1.873 2.297 2.721 3.145 1.697 1.272 0.848 0.424
(200,300] 1.116 1.493 1.871 2.249 2.627 1.511 1.133 0.755 0.378
(300,500] 0.836 1.174 1.512 1.851 2.189 1.353 1.015 0.677 0.338
>500 0.417 0.707 0.998 1.288 1.578 1.161 0.871 0.581 0.290
50Table 9: Broker Costs and Prots for Dierent Loan Types The table reports average marginal broker costs
per loan for dierent types of loans and dierent cost specications c
w in Equation (13), conditional on the size of the
loan. Columns labeled \prft
0" report average marginal broker prots per loan for the perfect rent extraction case.
Costs and prots are shown in $1,000. Our data include 668,582 loans originated between 1997 and 2006.
Loan amt  100K Loan amt 100-300K Loan amt > 300K
c0 c1 prft0 c0 c1 prft0 c0 c1 prft0
Loan and property characteristics
2/28 1.455 3.132 1.677 2.476 5.491 3.015 3.326 8.863 5.536
3/27 1.340 2.973 1.633 2.302 5.138 2.836 3.153 8.661 5.508
30yr FRM 1.191 2.859 1.668 2.213 4.996 2.783 3.060 7.883 4.823
20yr FRM 1.321 2.993 1.673 2.202 4.829 2.626 3.224 8.028 4.803
15yr FRM 1.214 2.756 1.542 2.155 4.722 2.566 3.119 7.781 4.661
Balloon w/ adj rate 1.424 2.861 1.437 2.495 5.662 3.167 3.237 9.150 5.913
Balloon w/ xed rate 1.329 2.642 1.313 2.335 5.448 3.112 3.132 9.271 6.139
Interest only 1.159 2.932 1.774 2.246 5.477 3.231 2.949 8.629 5.680
No prepay penalty 1.174 2.730 1.555 2.162 4.993 2.831 2.953 8.391 5.439
Prepay penalty 1.417 3.109 1.692 2.450 5.495 3.045 3.225 8.819 5.594
Full documentation 1.411 3.032 1.621 2.416 5.322 2.906 3.228 8.742 5.513
Low documentation 1.240 2.970 1.730 2.352 5.474 3.122 3.107 8.694 5.587
Stand-alone rst lien 1.346 3.006 1.660 2.420 5.436 3.016 3.181 8.675 5.494
Piggyback 1.459 3.075 1.617 2.251 5.179 2.928 3.085 8.836 5.751
Purchase 1.181 2.810 1.629 2.136 4.988 2.852 2.955 8.469 5.514
Re, cash out 1.485 3.129 1.644 2.590 5.718 3.128 3.338 8.953 5.615
Re, no cash out 1.274 3.067 1.794 2.193 5.021 2.828 3.047 8.423 5.375
Primary residence 1.431 3.064 1.633 2.426 5.442 3.016 3.184 8.762 5.579
2nd home/investment property 0.960 2.741 1.782 1.986 4.816 2.830 2.839 8.112 5.273
One unit 1.355 3.014 1.659 2.367 5.352 2.985 3.133 8.604 5.471
Multi units 1.357 2.965 1.608 2.684 5.898 3.214 3.334 9.495 6.161
Borrower characteristics
FICO < 600 1.469 3.090 1.621 2.542 5.591 3.049 3.442 9.075 5.634
FICO 2 [600;620) 1.388 3.006 1.618 2.426 5.359 2.933 3.252 8.852 5.600
FICO 2 [620;660) 1.254 2.938 1.684 2.319 5.262 2.943 3.133 8.631 5.497
FICO  660 1.008 2.802 1.794 2.132 5.140 3.008 2.923 8.453 5.530
AAA or AA 1.339 2.932 1.593 2.318 5.268 2.950 3.092 8.657 5.564
A+ 1.274 3.019 1.744 2.431 5.426 2.995 3.284 8.689 5.405
A  1.418 3.123 1.705 2.522 5.588 3.066 3.398 9.029 5.632
B 1.482 3.177 1.695 2.633 5.823 3.191 3.556 9.268 5.712
C 1.388 3.034 1.647 2.567 5.917 3.350 3.411 9.505 6.094
Broker variables
Low broker competition 1.313 2.985 1.673 2.268 5.104 2.836 3.077 8.608 5.531
High broker competition 1.449 3.070 1.621 2.499 5.650 3.151 3.209 8.780 5.571
Active broker 1.628 3.259 1.631 2.636 5.890 3.254 3.365 9.261 5.896
Inactive broker 1.248 2.914 1.667 2.261 5.129 2.869 3.049 8.425 5.376
Neighborhood and regulation variables
Race,  75% white 1.431 3.033 1.602 2.568 5.757 3.190 3.271 9.016 5.745
Race, > 75% white 1.279 2.990 1.711 2.221 5.043 2.822 2.990 8.266 5.276
Education,  12.5% w/ BA 1.389 2.993 1.604 2.478 5.490 3.012 3.344 9.026 5.682
Education, >12.5% w/ BA 1.283 3.049 1.766 2.306 5.294 2.989 3.065 8.557 5.493
Baseline anti-predatory regulation 1.327 3.106 1.779 2.249 5.161 2.912 3.082 8.413 5.331
Stricter state anti-pred regulation 1.405 2.838 1.433 2.509 5.585 3.076 3.179 8.795 5.616
Location
Metro area 1.362 3.035 1.674 2.396 5.424 3.029 3.159 8.726 5.567
Non-metro area 1.317 2.887 1.570 2.300 4.946 2.646 3.137 8.433 5.296
51Table 10: Proposed QRM Guidelines The table summarizes the QRM requirements, as proposed by the Agencies
in March 2011. In addition to the main criteria listed below, certain assumability prohibitions and default mitigation
commitments apply. For details, see Agencies (2011).
Rule Reference name Description
1 Eligible loans First liens on a one-to-four family residential property
Home purchased or renanced has to be the principal residence
Piggyback loans are prohibited for purchases, maturity  30 years
2 Borrower credit Borrower is not currently  30 days past due on any debt,
history has not been  60 days late within the past 2 years
Borrower has not been a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding,
has not had property repossessed or foreclosed upon,
did not engaged in a short sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure,
and has not been subject to a Federal or State judgment for collection
of any unpaid debt in the past 3 years
3 Payment terms Balloon or interest-only payments, or negative amortization, not allowed
Regular P&I payments may not result in increase of unpaid principal,
do not allow borrower to defer payment of interest or repayment of principal
Increases in rates after closing of adjustable-rate loans may not exceed 2%
in any 12-month period, or 6% over the life of the mortgage transaction
Prepayment penalties are not permitted
4 Loan-to-value LTV  80% for purchases
ratio CLTV  75% for no-cash-out renance mortgages
CLTV  70% for cash-out renance mortgages
5 Down payment Financing of closing costs is not permitted
For purchases, the minimum cash down payments are closing costs,
plus 0.2  min(appraisal value, purchase price),
plus max(purchase price-appraisal value, 0)
Funds used by the borrower must come from certain acceptable sources
6 Qualifying Written appraisals conforming to generally accepted appraisal standards
appraisal are required
7 Ability to repay Borrower's front-end ratio (mortgage payment/gross income)  28%
Borrower's back-end ratio (all debt payments/gross income)  36%
Full documentation of monthly gross income, housing debt and total debt
8 Origination Origination charges paid by borrower  3% of the loan amount
charges Charges include (i) compensation paid directly or indirectly to originator
(ii) nance charges (12 CFR section 226.4(a)(b), except 226.4(b)(1))
(iii) real-estate related fees (12 CFR section 226.4(c)(7)), unless reasonable
(iv) credit insurance premia, debt cancellation or suspension fees

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































53Table 12: Delinquency Rates under QRM Rules In the top panel, the rst column shows the distribution of
loans across dierent size bins and the second column reports the average 12-month delinquency rates for each size
bin. For each size bin, the third column shows the percentage of QRM8 loans in that size bin for the perfect rent
extraction case (w=0 in Equation (13)), and the fourth column reports the average 12-month delinquency rate of
these QRM8 loans. Columns 5 through 12 report similar statistics after replacing w = 0 by w = 0:25;0:5;0:75;1. The
middle panel recomputes the statistics from the top panel after replacing QRM Rule 8 by the alternative specication
described in Appendix E. Small discrepancies between the top and middle panel for 100-200K loans are due to the
fact that size bins are formed on the loan amount of the rst lien whereas limits on origination charges for piggybacks
are computed as a function of the total loan amount. For each size bin, the bottom panel shows the percentage of
















size bin loans delq in bin delq in bin delq in bin delq in bin delq in bin delq
(0,50] 3.4 17.0 77.4 15.9 56.7 14.3 30.0 13.1 14.9 11.9 9.6 12.6
(50,75] 10.6 19.0 86.8 18.0 67.4 16.4 43.3 15.1 27.6 15.3 19.2 16.1
(75,100] 12.0 15.1 97.4 14.9 85.5 14.1 62.6 13.0 43.6 12.7 31.9 12.7
(100,200] 37.2 12.4 99.9 12.3 97.3 12.1 83.0 11.5 64.4 10.9 49.8 10.5
(200,300] 20.0 11.4 100.0 11.4 100.0 11.4 95.7 11.1 82.1 10.6 66.6 10.2
(300,500] 14.7 11.8 100.0 11.8 100.0 11.8 99.5 11.8 93.3 11.5 80.3 10.9
>500 2.0 13.8 100.0 13.8 100.0 13.8 100.0 13.8 100.0 13.8 98.0 13.8
All 100.0 13.3 97.5 13.1 92.3 12.6 79.8 11.9 64.8 11.4 51.9 11.0
Alternative specication of QRM Rule 8
c0 c0:25 c0:5 0:75 c1
size bin in bin delq in bin delq in bin delq in bin delq in bin delq
(0,50] 77.4 15.9 56.7 14.3 30.0 13.1 14.9 11.9 9.6 12.6
(50,75] 86.8 18.0 67.4 16.4 43.3 15.1 27.6 15.3 19.3 16.1
(75,100] 97.4 14.9 85.5 14.1 62.6 13.0 43.6 12.7 31.9 12.7
(100,200] 99.9 12.3 97.3 12.1 83.0 11.5 64.3 10.9 49.6 10.5
(200,300] 100.0 11.4 99.9 11.4 92.9 10.9 75.7 10.4 60.0 9.9
(300,500] 100.0 11.8 100.0 11.8 93.7 11.3 74.1 10.2 57.6 10.0
>500 100.0 13.8 100.0 13.8 98.7 13.7 72.8 11.8 52.2 11.2
All 97.5 13.1 92.3 12.6 78.4 11.8 60.1 11.0 46.2 10.7
Other QRM Rules
QRM1 QRM2 QRM3 QRM4 QRM5 QRM7
size bin in bin delq in bin delq in bin delq in bin delq in bin delq in bin delq
(0,50] 66.5 16.5 46.0 15.6 18.6 14.5 54.3 17.6 25.5 13.4 27.5 15.7
(50,75] 68.2 17.7 64.6 19.0 10.4 14.8 32.5 17.6 26.4 16.4 23.4 15.8
(75,100] 70.6 14.0 68.8 14.4 7.7 9.5 36.4 13.5 27.1 13.0 19.8 12.2
(100,200] 72.4 11.8 71.4 10.6 3.9 9.4 37.4 11.3 29.2 10.9 13.9 8.9
(200,300] 72.6 10.7 75.6 9.4 2.4 5.6 37.0 11.0 33.1 10.5 8.2 6.9
(300,500] 69.7 10.5 80.3 10.2 1.6 6.3 35.7 13.2 35.4 11.4 5.8 5.6
>500 65.7 9.5 84.0 13.4 0.9 5.1 37.5 19.3 39.3 11.6 6.0 8.6
All 71.0 12.4 71.9 11.6 4.8 10.9 37.0 12.8 30.4 11.8 13.6 10.7
54Table 13: Broker Prots under QRM Rules For dierent measures of broker costs, the top panel reports the
percentage of QRM8 loans in our sample (columns labeled \%"), the average broker prots for the QRM8 loans in
$1,000 (columns labeled \No cap"), and the average broker prots for the QRM8 loans in $1,000 if revenues are
capped at 3% (columns labeled \Cap"). The second set of rows shows the fraction of loans in our sample that are
QRM8 loans and satisfy an additional QRM rule, the average broker prots for these loans, and the average broker
prots for these loans if revenues are capped at 3%. Results in the bottom panel replicate those in the top panel
after replacing the proposed QRM Rule 8 by the alternative specication of QRM Rule 8 described in Appendix E.













(0,50] 2.6 1.569 0.609 1.9 1.104 0.369 1.0 0.560 0.220 0.5 0.178 0.117
(50,75] 9.2 1.588 0.689 7.1 1.070 0.444 4.6 0.554 0.285 2.9 0.202 0.145
(75,100] 11.7 1.834 0.969 10.3 1.259 0.622 7.5 0.680 0.394 5.2 0.263 0.199
(100,200] 37.2 2.538 1.753 36.2 1.858 1.157 30.9 1.082 0.710 24.0 0.444 0.351
(200,300] 20.0 3.858 3.170 20.0 2.892 2.206 19.2 1.815 1.329 16.5 0.773 0.635
(300,500] 14.7 5.330 4.914 14.7 3.997 3.582 14.7 2.646 2.263 13.8 1.232 1.080
>500 2.0 7.240 7.222 2.0 5.430 5.412 2.0 3.620 3.602 2.0 1.810 1.792
All 97.5 3.127 2.408 92.3 2.357 1.732 79.8 1.533 1.155 64.8 0.709 0.598
Interaction of QRM Rule 8 with other QRM rules
QRM c0 c0:25 c0:5 c0:75
1 & 8 68.9 3.158 2.337 64.8 2.382 1.663 54.8 1.536 1.102 43.1 0.694 0.570
2 & 8 70.6 3.163 2.544 67.9 2.386 1.833 60.4 1.563 1.213 50.3 0.729 0.624
3 & 8 4.6 2.242 1.614 4.3 1.701 1.145 3.5 1.095 0.777 2.6 0.504 0.416
4 & 8 36.9 3.054 2.405 36.4 2.294 1.666 35.1 1.525 0.945 33.1 0.748 0.223
5 & 8 30.3 2.646 2.193 29.8 1.988 1.558 27.4 1.286 1.008 23.5 0.586 0.506
7 & 8 13.0 2.518 1.705 11.8 1.881 1.212 9.4 1.181 0.821 7.2 0.529 0.433













(0,50] 2.6 1.569 0.609 1.9 1.104 0.369 1.0 0.560 0.220 0.5 0.178 0.117
(50,75] 9.2 1.588 0.689 7.1 1.070 0.444 4.6 0.554 0.285 2.9 0.202 0.145
(75,100] 11.7 1.834 0.969 10.3 1.259 0.622 7.5 0.680 0.394 5.2 0.263 0.199
(100,200] 37.2 2.538 1.750 36.2 1.858 1.154 30.9 1.081 0.707 23.9 0.443 0.349
(200,300] 20.0 3.858 2.973 20.0 2.889 2.011 18.6 1.744 1.183 15.2 0.708 0.564
(300,500] 14.7 5.330 4.104 14.7 3.997 2.772 13.8 2.454 1.586 10.9 0.958 0.768
>500 2.0 7.240 5.722 2.0 5.430 3.912 2.0 3.578 2.132 1.4 1.369 1.003
All 97.5 3.127 2.213 92.3 2.357 1.527 78.4 1.466 0.949 60.1 0.596 0.470
Interaction of alternative QRM Rule 8 with other QRM rules
QRM c0 c0:25 c0:5 c0:75
1 & 8alt 68.9 3.158 2.149 64.8 2.381 1.464 53.6 1.457 0.904 39.8 0.580 0.449
2 & 8alt 70.6 3.163 2.333 67.9 2.385 1.614 59.4 1.500 0.996 46.7 0.615 0.489
3 & 8alt 4.6 2.242 1.573 4.3 1.701 1.101 3.5 1.083 0.727 2.6 0.477 0.379
4 & 8alt 36.9 3.054 2.208 36.4 2.294 1.466 35.0 1.503 0.745 31.9 0.687 0.061
5 & 8alt 30.3 2.646 2.053 29.8 1.988 1.415 27.1 1.244 0.868 22.4 0.510 0.421
7 & 8alt 13.0 2.518 1.626 11.8 1.881 1.125 9.3 1.144 0.727 6.9 0.471 0.370
























Figure 1: Delinquency Rates The gure shows the fraction of loans delinquent as a function of months from
origination, by year of origination. The delinquency rate is dened as the cumulative fraction of loans that are past
due 60 days or more, in foreclosure, real-estate owned or defaulted, at or before a given age.
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Loan amount > 300K








































































Figure 2: Broker Revenues, Fees and YSP The top panel shows the unconditional distribution of dollar broker
revenues, fees and yield spread premia. The next four panels plot the distribution of dollar broker revenues conditional
on loan size, loan type, documentation level or the borrower's FICO score.
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Figure 3: Delinquency Risk, Loan Size and Percentage Broker Revenues The left gure displays average 12-
month delinquency rates as a function of percentage broker revenues. The middle and right gure show, respectively,
average percentage revenues and average 12-month delinquency rates for loans in dierent size bins.














































































Figure 4: Conditional Cost Distributions The gure shows the empirical cost distribution, conditional on a loan
amount between 100 and 300K, for dierent levels of w in Equation (13). Loans with revenues at or below the 5%
quantile (2.3K) are not shown.


















































Figure 5: Proposed and Alternative QRM Rule 8 The Agencies (2011) proposed a cap of 3% on percentage
origination charges. The alternative rule described in Appendix E restricts loan origination charges to 3% of the loan
amount for loans of 200K or less, and to 10K for loans of more than 500K. In between, maximum dollar charges grow
according to a piecewise linear schedule, which caps origination charges at 8K and 9K for 300K and 400K loans.
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